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Introduction
Democratization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Post-Soviet States
Although Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
share the common experience of  the demise of  the Warsaw Pact and the fall of  
the former Soviet Union, the political situation in those countries today is mark-
edly diverse. 20 years after the fall of  the Berlin wall and the iron curtain, most 
states in Central and Eastern Europe are considered consolidated democracies 
and the states of  ex-Yugoslavia, albeit to a different extent, have also made sig-
nificant progress towards democracy in the wake of  the civil wars of  the 1990s. 
Moreover, the orange and velvet revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia have been 
considered a model for further democratization in post-Soviet states. Many of  the 
aforementioned “success stories” are linked to factors such as the socializing role 
of  the European Union and NATO. Furthermore, the Council of  Europe and the 
OSCE have engaged in improving the human rights situation in all former Com-
munist countries and attempted to create flexible mechanisms for assuring political 
stability.
Yet, these developments are contrasted by the current situation in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus, where democratization efforts have either stalled, not been 
initiated or were met by a policy of  the iron fist. It is a tragic irony that the con-
flict between Georgia and Russia over secessionist South Ossetia in August 2008 
might be considered a further illustration of  how differently democracy has taken 
root in the area and how conflicting geopolitical agendas of  various actors might 
affect the outcome of  democracy promotion efforts and their effects for regional 
security.
The present volume presents the outcome of  DGAP’s 12th New Faces Confer-
ence, which, through various case studies, highlights the different trajectories and 
processes of  democratization in states of  former communist rule. The papers pre-
sented at the conference in Prague analyze measures and criteria of  democracies in 
general, successful cases of  democratization and current challenges and obstacles 
to democratization. In addition, the contributions seek to analyze the effectiveness 
of  various actors and their democratization efforts and extend the security-related 
by going beyond the democratic peace thesis. We sincerely hope that the following 
summaries of  the presentations held in Prague will provide the reader with some 
fresh ideas on the complex nature and relation of  democracy and security.
David Bosold and Kathrin Brockmann
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The Advantages of Latitude: Estonia’s Post-Communist 
Success Story
Paper summary
Lucas Kello
Estonia’s geographic and ethnic proximity to the Nordic countries—one of  the 
most stable, wealthy, and liberal regions of  the world—has uniquely favored the 
country in its transition following the regaining of  independence in 1991. Indeed 
few cases in post-Communist Europe demonstrate so well the potential benefits 
of  foreign intervention in the process of  democratization and free-market reform. 
This enquiry expounds the impact of  Nordic-Estonian relations on Estonia’s post-
Communist transition, in particular, its pursuit of  economic prosperity and physi-
cal security. At its most fundamental, the analysis considers the interplay between 
ideological and material factors: How Estonian policy-makers’ consistent desire to 
return their country to the “Western” fold and, more specifically, to attain the se-
curity and development of  nearby Finland and Sweden, framed the country’s bold 
reform strategy and, in so doing, largely determined structural transfers of  wealth, 
technology, and military assistance from the nearby Nordic states.
Return to the West, entry to the North
The transition from foreign oppression to independence and democracy is a pro-
cess by which a nation is reconciled with a conception of  itself  which had thereto-
fore been suppressed or forcefully accommodated to the vision of  the conquering 
power. The gulf  between the indigenous and alien visions is all the more pro-
nounced when, as in the case of  Soviet expansionism, subjugation is premised on 
nothing less than the transformation of  international society—and so too of  the 
captive nation. For the Soviet occupiers of  1940 arrived on a platform not only of  
conquest but also of  centralized denationalization; only thus can one apprehend 
the systematic deportations, executions, and population transfers in Estonia after 
1945.
Yet a vision of  Estonia independent of  the will of  Moscow was not fully ex-
punged. It perdured in the private thoughts of  those who remained in captivity, 
the majority of  which rejected the Soviet identity. What was the substance of  this 
subversive vision which would later underpin the country’s transition to freedom? 
Two basic elements may be stressed. First, a persistent identification with Western 
culture and customs, as made manifest by the experiences and memories of  the in-
Lucas Kello
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ter-war Republic, which provided a sharp relief  against Soviet repressions. Second, 
the country’s cultural and historical affinity with the Nordic countries. Linguistic 
and geographic proximity to Finland in particular furnished Estonians a unique 
bridge to the West during the period of  Soviet occupation. For example, the 
penetration of  Finnish television into northern Estonia represented an important 
cultural breach in the Iron Curtain. There was also the impact of  Finland’s suc-
cess story as standard to be attained: In 1940, Estonia and Finland had achieved a 
comparable level of  social and economic development; for this reason, the diver-
gence in the two countries’ trajectory after 1945 came to be regarded as a historical 
aberration in need of  correction. So it was that in 1998 Estonia’s foreign minister 
exclaimed: “Estonia should aim to become just another boring Nordic country.”
The Nordic countries and the Estonian “economic miracle”
The transition to a market economy presented Estonian policy-makers with a 
formidable choice between graduated and radical reforms. According to Mart Laar, 
the first democratically elected leader after 1945, Finland’s success “created a good 
basis for radical reforms.” Three aspects of  Estonia’s radical reform strategy may 
be noted; in each, the Nordic countries played an instrumental role.
A. Commercial openness. One of  the most striking developments occurred in the 
reorientation of  trade. By 1992 the Laar government dismantled nearly all trade 
restrictions. That same year Finland became Estonia’s main trading partner, and 
by 2000 Finland and Sweden accounted for 51 percent of  the country’s total trade. 
Trade with the advanced Nordic markets produced significant advantages in the 
form of  increased industrial production and overall competitiveness, helping to 
fuel the economic boom of  the late 1990s.
B. FDI. In the 1990s Estonia achieved formidable success in attracting foreign—
particularly Nordic—capital. Four policy initiatives from 1992–94 drove this 
achievement: (i) introduction of  the kroon and stabilization of  the currency mar-
kets; (ii) swift legislation to bolster the rule of  law; (iii) a head-on fight against cor-
ruption; (iv) a firm commitment to private property and removal of  entry barriers 
to foreign investors. These swift and daring initiatives facilitated massive influxes 
of  Nordic capital, so that by 2000 Finland and Sweden together accounted for 80 
percent of  capital inflows.
C. ICT revolution. The development of  Estonia’s information and communications 
technology sector is a defining feature of  the country’s economic transition. Today 
the internet permeates private and public life in Estonia, further bolstering the 
The Advantages of Latitude: 
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country’s economic competitiveness. Two factors were paramount in this develop-
ment: Nordic capital and technology transfers, which enabled Estonia to become 
a player in the global ICT production network, coupled with Estonian policy-mak-
ers’ consistent commitment to pioneering sophisticated ICT practices.
Nordic interventions in Estonia’s quest for security after 1991
For a tiny nation such as Estonia long the victim of  foreign occupation, no 
achievement in democratic governance or economic prosperity could be meaning-
ful unless the country’s physical integrity could also be safeguarded. In 1991 that 
seemed a distant prospect indeed. For Estonia had almost no defense infrastruc-
ture whatever—even as the former occupying power maintained thirty-thousand 
troops on national soil. The quest for security had therefore to be launched from 
scratch. The Nordic countries, especially Finland and Denmark, played a central 
but also partly contradictory role in this endeavor. Three themes must be consid-
ered here:
A. Military hardware. The Nordics were instrumental in building up Estonia’s hard-
power capabilities. In 1992 the Finns provided patrol vessels and much-needed 
financial assistance; in 1994 they began wholesale donation of  retired but useable 
equipment; in 2002–03 they were centrally involved in the establishment of  an air 
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surveillance system in Estonia. In later years, Denmark too assisted in the drafting 
of  defense procurements in line with NATO requirements.
B. Defense doctrine. During the early post-Communist years Estonia lacked a co-
herent defense doctrine. This owes to a fundamental “battle of  ideas” between 
two competing perspectives—one borrowed from Finland, the other impulsed 
by Denmark. The “Finnish Boys” (Soomepoisid) advocated adoption of  a Finn-
ish-style defense model based on “total defense” and conscription, derived from 
Finland’s experience in the Winter War (1939–40). Others sought a military force 
centered on professional deployable units, as required under NATO accession 
criteria.
By 1993 NATO accession became established as the country’s prime security 
objective. Yet it was the Finnish model that in practice gained ascendancy dur-
ing the early years of  transition—in 1996, for instance, the Riigikogu (legislature) 
approved a total defense structure. Ideological interventions from Finland played 
a major role in this development: “Total defense” was advanced most promi-
nently by young Estonian officers who had trained in Finland and, later, by the 
General Staff, which in 1996 launched a formal working relationship with retired 
Finnish officers (Viroprojekt). Yet plans to create a professionalized mobile force 
advanced in parallel. In 1994 a Baltic Battalion was established to prepare for 
peacekeeping missions; in 1998 a Baltic Defense College was founded in Tartu, 
furthering the cause of  a professional army. Both of  these were Danish-led 
initiatives.
The doctrinal incongruities of  the 1990s have since been largely resolved. Today 
the concept of  “total defense” and professional units coexist as complementary 
pillars of  Estonia’s national defense model. But the ideological contentions of  
earlier years have left a unique imprint, in that Estonia is one of  the few former 
Communist members of  NATO to have retained conscription.
C. Cyber-defense leadership. Estonia has recently been able to carve for itself  a niche 
within NATO in the area of  cyber-defense. Two factors were key here. First, is 
Estonia’s success in establishing a sophisticated critical information infrastructure 
largely, as was noted, through the assistance of  Nordic capital and technology 
transfers. Second, is the country’s expertise in cyber-defense, acquired during 
the large-scale “denial-of-service” attacks of  April 2007. This experience raised 
Estonia’s profile within NATO as a vanguard nation in the field of  cyber-security, 
as evidenced by the alliance’s decision in 2008 to establish a Cyber-Defense Center 
of  Excellence in Tallinn.
The Advantages of Latitude: 
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4. Closing remarks
There is no doubt that Estonia’s location along the fifty-ninth parallel at the pe-
riphery of  the Nordic community has conferred it special advantages in its quest 
for prosperity and security after 1991. Today, Estonia ranks thirteenth in the world 
in economic freedom, third in press freedom, and second in “e-governance”—all 
firsts among the former Communist states. The factors which combined to pro-
duce these benefits were both ideological and material in character.
In the economic sphere, an ideological commitment to Western norms and, in par-
ticular, the use of  Finland as an exemple for swift radical reform were instrumen-
tal in delivering Estonia’s “economic miracle” of  price stability, rapid growth, high 
FDI inflows, and technological development. In the area of  security, the Nordics 
were key in developing Estonia’s defense infrastructure and doctrine. Although 
conflicting doctrinal inputs from Finland and Denmark partly obstructed the path 
to NATO operability, Estonia has recently demonstrated its ability to participate 
successfully in NATO missions abroad (e. g., Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo) even 
as it retains a commitment to total defense at home. Further, the decision to host 
NATO’s cyber-defense nucleus in Tallinn suggests that Estonia is well poised to 
assume a position of  leadership within the alliance disproportionate to the coun-
try’s small size.
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Authoritarianism versus Democracy in Belarus: Does 
National Identity Matter?
Hanna Vasilevich
18 years after the collapse of  the USSR, Belarus, once one of  the most prosperous 
and promising Soviet Republics, has chosen a radical and unexpected way of  de-
velopment instead of  following its western neighbors Latvia and Lithuania, which, 
while sharing a similar background and history, are nowadays members of  the EU.
In 1994, after three years of  democratic and economic reforms similar to the ones 
in Latvia and Lithuania, Belarusians elected a president who has been concentrat-
ing all power in his hands and installed a soviet-style rule over the country. Some 
people call him “accidental president” (Paval Šaramiet and Śviatlana Kalinkina, 
Niezvyčajny Prezydent), suggesting he came into office by chance and abused the 
power associated with his position. However, neither the choice of  the president 
nor the authoritarian regime established in Belarus today can be considered ac-
cidental. Instead, the lack of  national identity in Belarus seems to be a plausible 
explanation for this situation.
Definitions of nation, authoritarianism and dictatorship
The explanation that the return of  Belarus from the path of  democratic reform to 
authoritarianism is based on the lack of  national identity, requires some prelimi-
nary definitions.
According to Ernest Gellner “two men are of  the same nation if  and only if  they 
share the same culture, where culture in turn means a system of  ideas and signs and 
associations and ways of  behaving and communicating.”1 Josef  Stalin considered 
nation as “a historically formed stable community of  language, territory, economics 
and of  a psychical individuality resulting from cultural values”.2 Since culture is one 
of  the key elements to define a nation it is necessary to add another description of  
culture in the USSR by Stalin which he characterized as “national in form, social-
ist in content.” This perception merges the notions of  socialist and national and 
makes people perceive socialism as a part of  their own culture, which leads to the 
acceptance of  the Soviet mentality meaning a strong adherence of  a person to the 
past Soviet system at the expense of  one’s own national consciousness.
1 Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism. Ithaca, NY, 1983, p. 7.
2 Karl Josef  Partsch, Nations, Peoples, in: Encyclopedia of  public international law : Publ. under the auspices of  the 
Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law under the direction of  Rudolf  Bernhardt / 
Assistant General Editor: Peter Macalister-Smith., Amsterdam [etc.] 1997, vol. 3, pp. 511-515 (512).).
Hanna Vasilevich
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Furthermore, authoritarian regime and dictatorship, two different terms often used 
to describe Alexander Lukashenka’s rule, have to be distinguished. An authoritar-
ian regime, according to Andrew Heywood, is a practice to exercise government 
“from above;” the exercise of  authority regardless of  the consent of  the governed. 
It differs from authority which rests in people’s legitimation. While oppressing 
opposition and political liberties the regime may tolerate a significant range of  
economic, religious and other freedoms.3 Dictatorship in Heywood‹s opinion is a 
rule by a single individual; in short, the arbitrary and unchecked exercise of  power. 
Dictators are seen as being above the law and as acting beyond their constitutional 
constraints.4 Lukashenka is acting within the scope of  Belarusian laws which were 
legitimized by referenda. However, the consent of  the governed is formal. Despite 
oppressing the opposition, Lukashenka’s regime tolerates a significant range of  
economic, religious and other freedoms which classifies it as authoritarianism.
Short historical overview
Belarusian society saw itself  as rather Soviet and therefore independence did not 
result in a clear vision for nation-building. Independence came indeed as a surprise 
for one of  the most stable and prosperous republics of  the USSR, and both the 
elites and the people were not prepared for it. There was no real alternative to the 
Communist Party, whose leadership lacked nationally-oriented charismatic figures 
(such as Algirdas Brazauskas in Lithuania).
The three years from 1991 to 1994, during which Belarus was run by the (post)-
communist nomenclature, were mainly spent on the fight against the economic 
crisis, the creation of  state institutions, and the introduction of  a rewritten / re-
vised history, different from the one offered by Soviet textbooks, which in a way 
forced a sort of  Belaruthenization. However, the government neither had any 
clear program that was understandable for the population nor did it promote an 
ideology of  the new state by actively embracing a new or a forgotten identity.
From the very beginning, the Belarusian opposition mainly consisted of  a move-
ment that concentrated on cultural and linguistic issues. At the same time this 
opposition, the Belarusian Popular Front, was the only nationally oriented group 
in Belarusian politics that had never gotten any support from Belarusians under 
Soviet rule. It was also inconsistent in explaining its program and political goals 
to the population, with the incapability to properly explain the Chernobyl tragedy 
and Stalinist repressions to the society to name but the most prominent examples. 
3 Andrew Heywood, Key concepts in politics, Basingstoke, 2000, p. 158.
4 Heywood, op. cit., p. 166.
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Instead, the opposition repeatedly denied a “brotherhood” between Belarusians 
and Russians, a concept intensively and rather successfully promoted in the USSR. 
Some of  the former Soviet republics established their identity based on “other-
ness” and the contrast to being Russian. In Belarus where people mainly perceived 
themselves as Soviets rather than Belarusians this was not the case.
The development of Belarus after the collapse of the USSR
Lukashenka, after assuming power, reintroduced Russian as the official language 
next to Belarusian on an equal legal basis. He also promised and actively promoted 
the restoration of  the Belarusian-Russian “brotherhood.” It was president Lu-
kashenka who also eliminated national symbols—the white-red-white flag and the 
Chase (which was the coat of  arms of  the medieval Grand Duchy of  Lithuania)—
and replaced them with a flag and coat of  arms almost identical with those of  the 
Soviet Belarusian Republic. This “secured” the continuation of  Soviet traditions 
in Belarus which were different and incompatible with the traditions presented by 
the Belarusian national movement. In 1996, Lukashenka succeeded to convince 
the people of  the necessity to concentrate all power in his hands. This was the be-
ginning of  the authoritarian regime and proof  that people had not adopted a new 
identity but instead still followed the traditions established in the Soviet Union.
The opening panel with Lucas Kello from Estonia, Nik Hynek from IIR, Hanna Vasilevich from 
Belarus, and Tomáš Weiss from the Czech Republic
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Both President and opposition tried to “introduce” their often contradictory vi-
sions of  Belarus. On March 25, 1918, the Belarusian People’s Republic had been 
created—a key date for the opposition. However, the President did (and does) not 
include this date into the official canon of  Belarusian history. In his view, Belaru-
sian independence is directly linked to the victory in World War II. The war took 
the life of  every fourth, and according to some new researches even of  every 
third person living in Belarus before 1939. This war is hence still deeply rooted in 
people’s minds, especially in the memories of  those people who survived the war 
or were actively fighting it.
Against this background, Lukashenka promoted his vision of  Belarus in his 2001 
election campaign, using the slogan “for a strong and flourishing Belarus.” His 
promises included the combat against corruption, the increased role of  the gov-
ernment, economic liberalization with a guaranteed level of  social security and 
further integration with Russia.
On its turn, the opposition during this election campaign focused on a negative 
campaign against Lukashenka. This approach brought some advantages; a large 
part of  the society was unaware of  the situation of  the disappearances of  some 
prominent politicians (former Minister and MPs), businessmen, and journalists, 
who to a varying degree had criticized the regime. But the president’s team found 
an effective solution to this problem: they reminded the population of  Uladzimir 
Hancharyk’s (who was the candidate of  the united opposition during the 2001 
elections and the head of  the official Trade Union FTB) communist nomenclature 
past and high-lighted the early years of  independence, characterized by inflation, 
corruption, social insecurity and instability.
Moreover, Lukashenka did not just want to win the election, he aspired to become 
a “nation-wide elected” president (called Baćka, in Belarusian: Father), consid-
ered the master of  the house (in our case—of  the state). He started embracing 
the formula “people are me” and attempted to attract those for whom Belarusian 
independence and patriotism were more than just words. He referred to traditional 
values largely using slogans: “for Belarus,” or “for stability.” After the elections of  
2001, Lukashenka also initiated the creation of  the Belarusian Patriotic (currently 
Republican) Union of  Youth, aimed at the creation of  a politically loyal youth 
and future elites. This was combined with the introduction of  a state ideology in 
educational establishments. The latter represents rather subjective political think-
Authoritarianism versus 
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ing, but includes many attributes of  soviet nationalism and has been referred to by 
some authors as “egalitarian nationalism” (Natalia Leshchenko).5
The security dimension of Belarusian authoritarianism
Belarus is usually portrayed as an authoritarian country or even as a dictatorship 
and thus differs from all the countries of  the region which are seen as established 
or even consolidated  democracies. The divergence of  political regimes from 
the Belarusian one is a priori seen as a factor which threatens the country’s se-
curity especially taking into account the location of  Belarus, which borders the 
EU (neighboring Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). Another security issue is seen in 
Belarusian foreign policy’s orientation towards a closer union with Russia, which 
was implemented in a so-called “union state of  Belarus and Russia.”6 Given the 
tensions between the European Union and Russia (exemplified by the gas conflict 
with Ukraine, the war in Georgia, different approaches towards the independence 
of  Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), this “union state” is seen as a potential 
source of  instability in the region by some of  its neighbors. At the same time, 
there is a certain lack of  information about the real situation that exists in Belarus 
today. Therefore, the country is seen as a black box which has not been under-
stood yet and, in turn, this lack of  understanding and knowledge creates a feeling 
of  insecurity and threat in many European countries.
Nevertheless, it is also important to analyze the existing and available information 
that might help to create a framework for the events and trends in Belarus which 
might have security-related implications.
Firstly, it is important to understand the implications of  the “union state,” which 
might be seen as one of  the major threats. Established in the end of  the 1990s, 
when Boris Yeltsin was Russian president, the union had been developing quite 
quickly at the beginning (elimination of  the border control between Russian and 
Belarus, equal rights of  the citizens of  both countries, free movement of  goods 
and services). With Vladimir Putin entering into office and becoming the second 
Russian president, the process did, however, slow down significantly. The core 
problem of  the “union” became the introduction of  the Russian ruble as a com-
mon currency which was rejected by Belarusian authorities. Several attempts at 
blackmailing from the Russian side (increasing gas prices and cutting off  gas sup-
ply) failed to coerce Belarusian authorities and brought the “union” to stagnation. 
5  Cf. Natalia Leshchenko, The national ideology and the basis of  the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, in: Europe-Asia 
Studies, October 2008, pp. 1419–1433.
6  For further explanation see <http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/multilateral/int_org/ref/c06dda3682ded84c.html> and 
<http://soyuz.by/en/>.
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For Belarus, the “union state” can be understood as an economic tool to receive 
cheap natural resources and obtain easier access to the Russian market, whereas 
the political dimension of  this integration remains blocked by Belarusian authori-
ties. Therefore the “union” creates no threat to the EU or international commu-
nity in this respect. A good example in support of  this argument is the neutrality 
and unwillingness of  Belarusian authorities to recognize the independence of  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia despite strong Russian pressure.
Conclusion
Authoritarianism in Belarus should not be seen as an absolute threat or source of  
possible instability, since the regime itself  is stable enough to prevent the emer-
gence of  a regional “black hole.” Neither authorities’ election frauds, nor students’ 
and entrepreneurs’ protests, or even the economic sanctions were able to desta-
bilize the situation in the country. Surprisingly or not, over 50 per cent of  the 
population still support the regime, and so far the regime functions well to uphold 
stability within the country, with external events having little effect on the regime. 
In contrast, democratic Georgia and Ukraine, with all their turbulences and con-
stant changes are much less stable. The instability in other regions, however, does 
not affect stability in Belarus.
In that respect, even an undemocratic Belarus does not pose a security threat to 
the region. The understanding of  this fact and the role of  national identity for the 
regime’s popularity is crucial for the EU to make its negotiation efforts and policy 
towards Belarus more effective.
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Driving Forces of Change and Reform: Conditionality and its 
Inherent Limits
Tomáš Weiss
The European Union has a successful record in persuasion rather than coercion 
when it comes to supporting third countries to undergo thorough change and ini-
tiate reforms in line with the EU’s norms and values. The enlargement of  the EU 
has been the most effective tool in this respect, because it provided the EU with 
the largest and juiciest “carrot” in town. Enlargement has been called the EU’s 
most successful foreign policy tool. The lessons learned have been transferred into 
other policy areas, such as the European Neighborhood Policy or relations with 
ACP countries, with the principle of  conditionality.
All contributions presented in the panel “Democracy and Security: Perspec-
tives from Central and Eastern Europe” address the influence of  the EU and its 
member states on their neighborhood, their role in the transformation processes, 
as well as the limits of  such influence. Whereas the Estonian case can be regarded 
as a success, Belarus, called by some the black hole in Europe, has resisted any 
European pressure for change so far. The countries of  Central and Eastern Eu-
rope have made their way into the EU, but their transformation is still very much 
in progress as can be witnessed on an everyday basis, especially in more turbulent 
times, such as during the current financial and economic crisis. Several key lessons 
for the EU’s conditionality and its limits can be formulated.
Firstly, the basic decisions on the nature of  the system, the concrete institutional 
settings, and the identity of  the people have to be taken into account within a 
country. The EU cannot and mostly even does not want to take responsibility for 
these basic decisions, not least because there is neither a single institutional set-up 
nor identity within the EU and its member states and the EU would not be able 
to agree on and formulate a coherent recommendation. The examples of  Estonia 
and Belarus are compelling in this respect. The Estonian political elite as well as 
the population have deliberately decided to regard themselves as “Nordic,” which 
has not only guided them in their transformation and resulted in their EU and 
NATO membership, but also enabled close political and economic ties to the 
Scandinavians and Finland. Belarus, on the other hand, has so far remained will-
ingly oriented to its East due to the population’s (post-)Soviet sentiments. Similarly, 
the authoritarian regime has remained in power largely because the population has 
so far preferred stability over democracy and human rights.
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Secondly, however, the European Union can provide an impetus for bigger and 
more thorough change as soon as the demand is present within the countries. This 
is the very moment where conditionality can affect the behavior of  states, their 
politicians, and their people. The EU’s influence is twofold: It offers ready-made 
solutions based on the practice and experience in single member states, along with 
experts that may assist the country in transition. The role of  Italian experts help-
ing to set up the Czech ministry for regional development in the 1990s may serve 
as an illustration of  this point. At the same time, the EU and its requirements 
provide backing for the politicians within the country, and serve as an excuse and 
cover for painful reforms that accompany every transition (a practice well known 
not only in countries in transition, but also EU member states).
Thirdly, not everything that the EU requires from partners is clearly defined. 
Moreover, the EU’s demands hardly ever cover the whole spectrum of  measures 
that the country in transition must adopt. The EU is very detailed on technical 
issues, standardization, or economic and environmental topics, but very vague 
on issues of  good governance, the rule of  law, or in any other similar area. The 
country in transition might be required to provide for division of  power, but it will 
not be offered a single possible way of  how to achieve this. This limitation of  the 
EU’s influence reflects the way the EU works internally, summarized in the EU’s 
official motto “United in Diversity.” The EU is uniting on technicalities, but allows 
diversity on issues that do not require standardization in order to work properly 
within the integration context. While transitioning countries are not officially 
bound by the EU’s legal acts, first steps and reforms are usually taken to converge 
to the Union’s legal system. In this respect, the distinction between regulations and 
directives / framework decisions in European law is a useful tool and indicator for 
these countries to assess in which areas they may expect the EU to be very explicit 
or to give only broad guidelines.
Lastly, although financial assistance has also been a very useful carrot in the EU’s 
conditionality mechanism, there are certain limits to it as well. The transforma-
tion is very costly and the EU’s financial assistance cannot be more than what 
the name suggests. The bulk of  the costs have to be covered by the transitioning 
countries themselves.
To conclude, there are inherent limits to the European Union’s concept of  condi-
tionality. Change has to be initiated and largely also paid for from within the coun-
try. Only then the EU as a model and what it offers starts influencing the decisions 
more significantly. The conditionality helps the countries in transition change 
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more smoothly and swiftly, but the EU needs more tools to promote democracy 
and good governance, especially where the domestic pressures are not sufficient. 
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The European Union’s Three-Level Impact on 
Democratization of Ukraine: the Diplomatic Level, the 
Indirect Leverage, and the Bottom-Up Approach
Svitlana A. Kobzar
Serious irregularities during the 2004 presidential elections created a crisis in 
Ukraine and sparked a debate concerning the effectiveness of  the EU in support-
ing democratization1 in non-candidate states. There is little consensus either in EU 
institutions or in the Ukrainian government on the EU’s role during the election 
crisis but also, more importantly, the decade preceding it. In order to analyze the 
EU’s effectiveness in contributing to the movement of  Ukraine toward substan-
tive democracy, it is essential to provide a comprehensive analysis of  domestic 
and international elements prior to the 2004 elections. International factors made 
a significant contribution towards Ukraine’s democratization, but should not be 
considered the sole explanation of  the process. However, the aim of  this study is 
not to explain democratization in Ukraine, but rather to focus on the “EU factor” 
and the different levels of  influence that it exerts.2
Conceptualizing the “European Union Factor” in Democratization
To analyze the “EU factor” in the democratic transition of  Ukraine, it is useful 
to adopt some of  the elements from the literature that evaluates the impact of  
international organizations on the domestic reforms of  post-Soviet states.3 It is 
important to distinguish between the various types of  influence that the EU can 
exert. This paper examines the direct and indirect influences of  the EU, including 
the formal (the diplomatic / government) level of  regime change, the role of  the 
political elite and policy orientation.
On the formal level, the EU promotes democratization through political dialogue. 
The EU seeks to support institutional change in partner countries by such means 
1 Democratization is generally defined as “a process of  regime change that is directed towards a specific aim: the estab-
lishment and stabilization of  substantive democracy” (see H. Schmitz and K. Sell, International Factors in Processes 
of  Political Democratization: Towards a Theoretical Integration, in: Jean Grugel (ed.), Democracy Without Borders: 
Transnationalization and Conditionality in New Democracies, London and New York 1999, p. 25. 
2 This paper is a part of  the work-in-progress chapter from my doctoral dissertation. The research focuses on the period 
from 1994 to 2004. The chapter that this paper draws on encompasses the “external” factor in Ukraine’s discourse on 
Europe.
3 Much of  the increased volume of  literature in the past decade began to integrate international factors into their analysis 
of  democratization (See, for instance, Geoffrey Pridham, The International Dimension of  Democratisation: Theory, 
Practice and Inter-Regional Comparisons, in: Geoffrey Pridham [et al.] (ed.), Building Democracy? The International 
Dimension of  Democratisation in Eastern Europe, London and Washington, DC, 1994; H. Schmitz and K. Sell, In-
ternational Factors in Processes of  Political Democratization: Towards a Theoretical Integration, in: Jean Grugel (ed.), 
op. cit. (note 1).
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as regular summits, committee meetings and negotiations within the framework of  
the association or partnership agreements. Such institutionalization of  the politi-
cal dialogue may, in turn, contribute to the furthering of  democratic reforms by 
maintaining communication links with different members of  society.4 Influence 
through the formal level also includes the incorporation of  European institutional 
models, such as constitution making and judicial reform, which can be supported 
and / or directly influenced by the EU.
There is also an indirect influence on elite mentalities and external policy orienta-
tion. The “passive leverage” exercised by the EU may be the mere idea of  poten-
tial, yet unrecognized, membership.5 Even if  the idea of  a “return to Europe” may 
initially be pronounced as a declarative and historically symbolic statement, it can 
have a deeper effect on policy formulation and the mentality of  political elites; as 
Kubicek maintains: “The invocation initially may be cynical … but the very fact 
that the norms are given voice will affect their resonance.”6
Another important level that has been examined within the same conceptual 
framework is the influence of  the EU on civil society. The concept of  “civil 
society” itself  is ambiguous. Generally, organizations with functions in the areas 
“between the state and the individual” are referred to as civil society.7 While recog-
nizing that civil society includes a variety of  organizations and social movements, 
this paper will focus especially on the role of  the EU in supporting the NGO sec-
tor in Ukraine.
The Diplomatic Level: EU-Ukraine Political Dialogue and Democratization
Several factors contribute to a highly complex EU-Ukraine relationship which 
have impeded the EU’s ability to use all of  its resources to promote substantive 
democracy. The continual declarations by the Ukrainian government proclaiming 
its desire to pursue EU membership made it difficult for EU leaders to respond. 
As a large country with substantial agricultural and industrial sectors, Ukraine 
would not be an easy country for the EU’s stomach to “digest.” The weak politi-
cal and economic situation in Ukraine has made it easier for the EU to maintain a 
formal partnership and to retain the ability to postpone candidacy discussions.
4 Geoffrey Pridham, Rethinking regime-change theory and the international dimension of  democratisation: ten years after 
in East-Central Europe, in: Geoffrey Pridham and A. Agh (ed.), Prospects for democratic consolidation in East-Central 
Europe, New York and Manchester, 2001, pp. 75–76.
5 Milada Vachudova, The leverage of  International Institutions on Democratizing States: Eastern Europe and the 
European Union (Working Paper for the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 
RSCAS No. 33), San Domenico di Fiesole 2001, p. 7.
6 Paul Kubicek, International norms, the European Union, and democratization: tentative theory and evidence, in: Paul 
Kubicek (ed.), The European Union and Democratization, London and New York, NY, 2003, p. 15.
7 Jean Grugel, Democratization A Critical Introduction, New York, NY, 2002, p. 93.
The EU’s Three-Level Impact 
on Democratization of Ukraine

 
New Faces Conference 2009
It is important to note, nevertheless, that despite Leonid Kuchma’s abuse of  
power and the major hurdles that Ukraine encountered along the path toward 
democratic consolidation, the EU maintained a formal dialogue with the regime in 
power. Relations were maintained despite the apparent tensions on both sides over 
the implementation of  the PCA (Partnership and Co-operation Agreement), the 
membership issue and reports regarding instances of  human rights abuses. Dur-
ing interviews several officials reiterated that amid negotiations, EU leaders were 
careful not to alienate officials from the Kuchma Administration and thus push 
the country further towards the brink of  “Belarusification.” Ukraine’s size and its 
potential for instability could result in serious consequences for the EU if  that was 
to happen. Some EU officials shared the opinion that it was possible to recognize 
that the Ukrainian elite were not unanimous in their backing of  President Kuchma. 
Moreover, despite the frequent parallels drawn with Belarus, Ukrainian society has 
been more open than that of  Belarus. These caveats allowed the formal dialogue 
with the government to be used to continue disseminating ideas of  the impor-
tance of  democratization.8
8 Commission Official B., European Union Delegation of  the European Commission to Ukraine, Personal interview, 
Kyiv, May 5, 2005. 
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“Return to Europe” and Democratization: the Indirect Effect
By 1996 the European “vector” was declared as being among the primary foreign 
policy goals by the Ukrainian government.9 The Presidential Administration of  
Ukraine proclaimed its “European choice” by arguing that the concept was insepa-
rable from Ukrainian identity. In February 1996, Kuchma highlighted this point, 
stating, “the cradle of  Ukrainian culture is European Christian civilization. That is 
where our home is, above all, Europe.”10
Although the Kuchma Government did not necessarily follow its declarations with 
adequate policy implementation, the fact that the majority of  the elite and the 
general public supported such a foreign policy, legitimized the president’s efforts 
to consolidate power. The policy of  pursuing EU integration was presented as a 
way to provide security and economic prosperity, “membership in this exclusive 
‘club’ would be proof  of  Ukrainian success in the post-Soviet period.”11 The short 
history of  Ukraine’s foreign policy and the difficult transition path created a situa-
tion of  uncertainty among both members of  the elite and the general public. The 
conviction that the EU would enhance Ukraine’s security and economic develop-
ment was held not only by the pro-Western elite, but also by business and govern-
ment officials who believed in a “strategic partnership” with Russia.12
Several factors contributed to the internalization of  the idea of  a “return to Eu-
rope” whilst affecting indirectly the process of  democratization. By declaring Eu-
ropean integration as one of  its primary foreign policy goals, the Kuchma Admin-
istration took some steps towards institutionalizing this choice. By the early 2000s, 
however, there was a growing awareness among the Ukrainian elite of  the need for 
Ukraine to become a “European nation” with adequate democratic and economic 
standards. This awareness was evident in newspaper reports and speeches by pub-
lic officials who began to mention the need for Ukraine to prepare effectively to 
meet European standards.
9 Paul Kubicek, The European Union and Ukraine: real partners or relationship of  convenience?, in: Kubicek (ed.), op. cit. 
(note 6), p. 156.
10 Quoted in ibid.
11 Kubicek, op.cit (note 9), p. 157.
12 Kataryna Wolczuk, Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European Union (Work-
ing Paper for the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, RSCAS No. 15), San 
Domenico di Fiesole 2004, p. 13.
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The European Union and Democratization in Ukraine: the Bottom-Up Approach
After the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election several commentators noted the 
importance of  the role of  civil society.13 The sharp increase in the numbers of  
NGOs, from influential think tanks to small non-profit organizations, poses ques-
tions about their role in the democratic transition in Ukraine and the extent to 
which international support, that of  the EU in particular, helped to establish the 
“third sector.”
When evaluating EU influence on civil society in Ukraine, it is important to con-
sider both indirect and direct types of  influences on democratization, including a 
model that the EU provides to NGOs as well as financial assistance, which is cru-
cial for young organizations. Societal links between Ukraine and Central Eastern 
European countries enhanced the EU’s ability to influence Ukraine’s NGO sector 
indirectly. Ties with new EU members, Poland and Slovakia in particular, contrib-
uted to the development of  the “third sector” in Ukraine.
In 1992, with the European Parliament initiative, the Democracy Programme 
within the PHARE (originally: Poland and Hungary: Aid for Restructuring of  the 
Economies) and TACIS (echnical Aid to the Commonwealth of  Independent 
States) framework was established. Both, PHARE and TACIS, aimed at “contrib-
uting to the development of  pluralist democratic procedures and practices” by 
fostering a network of  NGOs and “educating” the citizens of  recipient countries 
concerning their role in a democratic society.14 Compared to PHARE Programme, 
the TACIS approach achieved different results which became evident during the 
slow political and economic transformations of  the recipient countries.15 Research 
conducted by the International Centre for Policy Studies, an analytical center 
based in Kyiv, has shown that “the ad hoc, non-systematic assistance in Ukraine 
has resulted in considerably slower transformation in every way” if  compared to 
the impact that the aid to Poland had after the collapse of  the Soviet Union.16
13 See Olaf  Hillenbrand, Good Governance and the Need for Consensus-Building—A Framework for Democratic Transi-
tion, in: Helmut Kurth and Iris Kempe (ed.), Presidential Election and Orange Revolution Implications for Ukraine’s 
Transition, Kyiv 2005, <http://www.cap.lmu.de/download/2005/2005_ukraine.pdf>, p. 27; Oleksandr Sushko and 
Oles Lisnychuk, The Election Campaign and Ukraine’s Political Evolution, in: ibid., p. 105; Iris Kempe and Iryna 
Solonenko, International Orientation and Foreign Support, in: ibid., p. 109.
14 See European Commission, Evaluation of  the PHARE and TACIS Democracy Programme 1992–1997, Brussels 1997.
15 The list of  TACIS recipients includes Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbeki-
stan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Mongolia (<http://europa.eu.int>). 
16 Policy Studies Technical Assistance: Two Views (International Centre for Policy Studies, Policy Studies No. 18), Kyiv, 
November 2002, p. 3. 
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Some authors argue that the contribution that TACIS has made to Ukraine’s civil 
society is “mixed” since funds are “spread too thin,”17 supporting NGOs located 
mainly in the capital.18 Small NGOs, particularly those dealing with social tran-
sition, have difficulties in competing for international funding. Their ability to 
exist and function effectively is exacerbated by the excessive red-tape intrinsic in 
Ukraine.
Conclusions
Different conclusions may be reached if  only one type of  EU influence is exam-
ined. The “EU factor” interacted with several domestic elements inherent in the 
democratization of  Ukraine, including government efforts to implement reforms, 
the elite’s desire to “return to Europe,” and the development of  civil society. The 
“Return to Europe” was among the most influential factors that became gradu-
ally internalized in the domestic agenda for reform in Ukraine (even though there 
are still members of  the ruling elite who often doubt Ukraine’s European voca-
tion). The EU’s power of  attraction has proved to be one of  the most powerful 
tools through which the EU was able to indirectly influence democratization in 
Ukraine. By institutionalizing the “European choice,” the Kuchma Administration, 
in turn, contributed to a gradual change in the perception of  Ukraine’s elite of  the 
requirements for EU membership. While initially, there was a belief  that Ukraine’s 
size and geographic location would guarantee the EU’s unconditional support, in 
the early 2000s, there was a shift in the elite’s perception which began to consider 
domestic factors as impediments to Ukraine’s successful integration with Europe. 
Kuchma’s failure to implement his declared policy contributed to the negative 
image among the Ukrainian elite and helped to discredit his government. It is 
important to note that there were numerous other factors, which contributed to 
Kuchma’s downfall, which, however, are beyond the scope of  this analysis.
17 Kybicek, The European Union and Ukraine: real partners or relationship of  convenience?, in: Kubicek (ed.), op.cit (note 
9), p. 160. 
18 In 2002, 15 percent of  all registered NGOs were located in Kyiv. See Liudmyla Kozak, Neuriadovi orhanizatsiï 
Ievropeis’koho Soiuzu: Porivnial’nyi analiz z hromads’kymy orhanizatsiiamy Ukraïny, (Dzvony myru,Kyiv University), 
Kyiv 2002, p. 30.
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Assessing NATO’s Potential Role for Democratization in 
Ukraine and Georgia
Heidi Hermisson
At this year’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, jointly held by 
France and Germany, one major issue which dominated the previous year’s summit 
was conspicuously downplayed–the future of  Ukraine and Georgia within the Alliance.
At the Bucharest summit in April 2008, the United States pushed hard for both 
Ukraine and Georgia to receive invitations for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), 
a program outlining the applicant country’s required reforms and its plan for ac-
cession. In the face of  intense Russian opposition, NATO members Germany and 
France refused to extend them a MAP invitation. As a compromise, NATO issued 
a statement that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of  NATO,” and 
supported their future entry, although the time line was unspecified.
The 2009 summit marked NATO’s sixtieth anniversary, and this historic milestone 
was an opportunity for a broad debate on the Alliance’s future in terms of  scope, 
mission, geography, and its role in the post-Cold War world. NATO’s possible 
enlargement into the former territory of  the Soviet Union itself  is part of  this 
debate, and it is against this backdrop that this paper addresses NATO’s potential 
impact on Ukraine and Georgia. Specifically, it assesses whether opening NATO’s 
doors to the two countries will help promote democracy in Ukraine and Georgia.
In order to do so, the paper is divided into two parts: First, there is a review of  the 
key aspects of  NATO’s democracy promotion capability. This is presented along 
with an accompanying assessment of  how much these capabilities could impact 
democracy in the cases of  Ukraine and Georgia. The conclusion of  this part is 
that NATO membership could make a positive, albeit severely limited, impact on 
Ukrainian and Georgian democratic progress.
NATO is only one external actor who may influence democratization in Ukraine 
and Georgia, however, and in the second part of  the paper, two other major ex-
ternal actors are discussed. The European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation 
both play an influential role in Ukraine and Georgia, with varying consequences 
for democratization. The EU is attempting to support democratization in Ukraine 
and Georgia by recreating some of  the instruments used in previous enlargements, 
which led to successful democracies in new members. Meanwhile, Russia has been 
wielding its influence as a detriment not just to Ukraine and Georgia’s NATO bid 
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but also to their democratic development. The final conclusion of  the paper, then, 
is that in light of  NATO’s general weak track record in promoting democracy 
and its particularly weak capabilities with regard to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO 
membership would not significantly aid democratization in these countries. Mem-
bership in NATO should not currently be the priority for either NATO or these 
countries. Both countries need to focus on internal reforms and governance sepa-
rately from the issue of  NATO membership, and as much as possible take advan-
tage of  prospects offered by the EU through the European Neighborhood Policy 
(ENP) and the new Eastern Partnership.
How could NATO help promote democracy in Ukraine and Georgia?
There are three ways in which NATO can help applicant countries in their democ-
ratization efforts. First of  all, through its procedures, joint missions and require-
ments it helps to bring military power securely under the wing of  the civilian gov-
ernment. This has played a major role in the progress of  democracy in countries 
such as Poland and Hungary. In the cases of  Ukraine and Georgia, civilian control 
over the military has never been a major issue, and is generally not considered one 
of  the most critical hurdles for democracy. However, there was an attempted mili-
tary coup in the run up to recent NATO military exercises scheduled in Georgia. 
This took place despite Georgia’s membership within the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), a program which both countries have concluded with NATO and under 
which each country has a number of  individual agreements and joint trainings and 
missions with NATO forces. Therefore any progress in this aspect should already 
be taking place within the NATO framework, and despite apparent setbacks in 
Georgia, it is not clear that offering full NATO membership would make a signifi-
cant difference for the democratization of  either country.
The second way in which NATO can help promote democracy in an applicant 
country is through the transfer of  norms and values. Many of  the Central and 
Eastern European countries which applied for NATO membership after the fall 
of  Communism considered NATO (along with the European Union) as one of  
the pillars of  western-style democracy, and were eager to adopt its principles in 
order to pursue their own democratic path. In order for these democratization 
incentives to materialize, however, the country’s population and elites must not 
only be in favor of  joining NATO, but should also be convinced of  the need for 
democracy, and not just the benefit of  a security guarantee which NATO has to 
offer. In Ukraine and Georgia, it is unclear whether these conditions are met, and 
therefore the extent to which NATO can play a role in transferring and supporting 
the adaptation of  norms is questionable.
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The final way in which NATO membership requires democratic development is 
that applicants must settle their territorial disputes with neighbors before join-
ing. Georgia has two hostile separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, over 
which it was provoked to armed conflict with Russia in August 2008. As a result 
of  this conflict, Ukraine has experienced some renewed ethnic and territorial 
tensions. Obviously, NATO’s membership requirement that a country establish 
regional stability with its neighbors should support democracy and stability in 
Ukraine and Georgia, but there is no real progress being made towards that goal. 
Georgia has not made serious diplomatic efforts to resolve its territorial issues, and 
its separatist regions have turned to Russia, an antagonist of  NATO, for support. 
While Georgia should pursue a resolution with its separatist regions and thus com-
ply with NATO’s requirement, there can be no serious discussion of  Georgia’s 
entry into the Alliance while the requirement remains unfulfilled. To do so would 
not only destabilize Georgia, but allowing a member who has a dispute with Rus-
sia to join NATO poses an enormous risk to the Alliance as a whole.
Other actors influencing democratization in Ukraine and Georgia
The path of  democracy in Ukraine and Georgia is also affected by the external 
actors, the EU and Russia. The EU has had great success influencing democracy 
in post-Communist neighbors through its enlargement process, known as the 
best democracy promotion tool ever. In an effort to replicate enlargement’s suc-
cess, the EU has created the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for its new 
neighbors. The ENP is a bilateral program which offers some of  the benefits of  
integration with the EU, such as participation in the internal market, in return 
for reforms undertaken by the countries. Both Ukraine and Georgia are currently 
participating in ENP agreements with the EU. In order to emphasize its interest 
in shaping democracy in former Communist countries to its east, the EU recently 
launched an “Eastern Partnership” initiative, which includes both Ukraine and 
Georgia and which represents an additional multilateral tool of  the EU in its rela-
tions with its Eastern neighbors.
However, NATO membership offers two key characteristics that EU member-
ship does not: an American presence and military power in defense. These issues 
are both extremely important for Ukraine and Georgia, and in these aspects EU 
membership can not substitute for NATO membership. The United States has 
supported democratic progress in both countries both financially and politically, 
and democratic governments in both countries seek the security and military pro-
tection of  NATO’s Article 5 which provides assurance that allies will defend other 
members in case of  an attack. It is possible that Ukraine and Georgia felt more 
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secure if  they had an assurance that the military power of  the US and European 
allies were behind them, and this might allow them to focus less on territorial 
integrity (i. e., conflict with Russia) and more on democratic reforms. These two 
potential benefits do play a significant role in the bid for NATO membership and 
are especially compelling to Ukraine and Georgia.
Russia figures largely into the politics and democratic processes in both Ukraine 
and Georgia. Due to their historical past, linguistic and ethnic ties, as well as en-
ergy dependence, relations with Russia remain extremely sensitive and important 
to both countries. Russia seems willing to intervene in its former territory when 
its interests are impinged, burdening democratic leaders through its military and 
energy power. In August 2008, Russia backed Georgia’s separatist regions against 
Georgian military incursion, and since the Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine, 
it has sharply raised gas prices and even shut off  supplies on an annual basis. This 
year’s gas row has tested an already-fractious government coalition, which has led 
to paralysis in the reform process.
In light of  the fact that NATO membership cannot significantly promote democ-
racy in neither Ukraine nor Georgia, even less so given the geo-political challenges 
presented by Russia’s continued influence, currently pursuing NATO member-
ship for Ukraine and Georgia under the argument of  promoting and supporting 
democracy in these countries does not stand.
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“Colored Revolutions” in the Wider Black Sea Region and 
the “Geopoliticization” of Democracy
Vsevolod Samokhvalov
In analyzing the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea re-
gion, and their effects for the regional security system, two questions are particu-
larly interesting. First, why have relations between these states and Russia, despite 
the initial enthusiasm about the colored revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, 
gradually deteriorated posing a serious threat to security in Eastern Europe and 
the Black Sea region? Second, what is the role of  Russian foreign policy in these 
developments and what are its driving forces and guiding principles with regard 
to the phenomenon of  democratization in its former sphere of  influence?
Contrary to the widely accepted opinion, the Russian Federation under Vladimir 
Putin has not pursued an overtly negative attitude towards democratization in the 
Balkans and the Black Sea Region, namely Serbia, Georgia, Abkhazia and Ukraine. 
More than that, Moscow demonstrated a certain understanding of  the demo-
cratic revolutions in Serbia and Georgia given the fact that the local leaders were 
highly unpopular. When the political crises in these countries reached their peak, 
the Russian Federation exerted pressure on the intransigent authoritarian leaders 
Slobodan Milošević and Eduard Shevarnadze to resolve the political standoff  and 
to prevent further destabilization of  the situation. Russia also provided assistance 
to the new democratic leadership of  Georgia to restore its control over the semi-
autonomous province of  Adjaria.
It was, however, noticeable that in all these cases the Russian side emphasized 
two points. First, Russia declared its expectations that the new democratic leader-
ship of  Serbia and Georgia would do its best to restore good relations with Mos-
cow. Second, Moscow voiced its concerns that democratic revolutions tended to 
undermine political stability and legal culture in these countries and in the region. 
Hence, in the two cases, Moscow tried to do its best in order to ensure its strong 
international standing regarding relations with these countries and in the Europe-
an system of  international affairs. It had constantly positioned itself  as a reliable 
mediator and security producer in the Wider Black Sea Area.
The divergent patterns of  Russia-Serbia and Russia-Georgia relations show that 
the key factor, which defined Russia’s position in relations to the new democra-
cies, was their allegiance with either the Euro-Atlantic or the Russia-led security 
system. Once Georgia demonstrated its intentions to join NATO and revise 
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the existing international arrangements concerning the breakaway republics of  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow adopted a more aggressive foreign policy 
towards Tbilisi.
The fact that “the West” had refused to admit Russia’s grievances about Georgia’s 
position regarding the breakaway republics was seen in Moscow as the indication 
that “the West” preferred the promotion of  its own interest over the preservation 
of  the status quo and fair-play rules in international politics. As a result, Mos-
cow radicalized its rhetoric about Western democratization projects, which were 
considered to be instruments of  “the West’s” geopolitical expansion and were to 
be treated accordingly.
With the geopoliticization of  democracy, Russia played an active role in the 
presidential elections in Abkhazia and Ukraine in 2004 by supporting pro-Russian 
candidates. Particularly in the case of  Abkhazia in 2004, Putin supported Abkhaz 
Prime-Minister and former KGB officer Raul Khadjimba, a protégé of  Abkhaz 
President in office Vladislav Ardzinba. In Ukraine, President Putin supported 
Prime-Minister Viktor Yanukovich, the Chairman of  the Party of  Regions, who 
mobilized support from the Russian-speaking population of  the East and South 
of  Ukraine.
In both cases, Russian policies failed. The democratic leaders in Abkhazia and 
Ukraine mobilized their supporters for public protests. Although Moscow did not 
succeed in bringing its own candidates into office, it still tried to ensure that its 
interests be secured in these countries. In Abkhazia, Moscow accepted the victory 
of  the democratic candidate on the condition that Kremlin’s protégé Khadjimba 
would be assigned vice-president. Once Russia secured that Abkhazia remained 
anchored to Russia under the new leadership, it did not attach great significance 
to the internal political developments in Abkhazia. In Ukraine, meanwhile, the 
Euro-Atlanticist President Viktor Yushchenko came to office with curtailed pow-
ers. The authorities of  the parliament were extended and Moscow secured its 
access to Ukrainian politics through the pro-Russian party of  Yanukovich. Krem-
lin had repeatedly stressed that it expected efforts from the Ukrainian leadership 
to restore Russian-Ukrainian relations. In particular, Moscow wanted Ukraine 
to support the integration processes in the Post-Soviet Space and reconsider its 
NATO-accession plans. However, Ukraine as well as Georgia seemed to have 
firmly opted for the Euro-Atlanticist course.
It was obvious that the Russian Federation would hardly be able to win the soft-
power competition with the EU, NATO and the US. Georgian and Ukrainian 
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political elites preferred European norms and standards over Russian patterns of  
social organization and its political system. Russia could not only balance such a 
situation by making Kiev and Tbilisi feel the negative outcomes of  the Euro-At-
lantic trajectory as tangible as possible. As the new democratic elites of  Ukraine 
and Georgia pursued their intention to join NATO and the EU, a number of  
crises erupted in their bilateral relations with Russia. The crises became manifest 
in sudden interruptions of  gas supply for Georgia, bans for import of  Georgian 
wines and mineral waters and Ukrainian dairy products and strong alcoholic 
drinks, as well as an increase of  gas prices for both countries.
Creating insecurities (energy leverage, trade wars, etc.) has been a frequently used 
instrument of  Russian foreign policy in relations with Black Sea democracies. 
The ultimate goal of  this policy was to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from turn-
ing to the Euro-Atlantic security system and demonstrate to other Post-Soviet 
states that explosive democratization might not lead to the proclaimed goals of  
stability, prosperity and security. This point became a central theme in the Russian 
strategic narrative about democracy in international affairs, with former President 
Putin voicing this view in every press conference and interview. In this respect, 
the destabilizing situation in Georgia and Ukraine and the simultaneous deterio-
ration of  their relations with Russia served as convincing evidence that Western 
democratization and reconstruction projects in the post-Soviet space inevitably 
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contributed to the destabilization of  the entire region. Put bluntly, the narrative 
postulated that what was done without Russia or its consent was doomed to fail.
Such policies had two consequences for the democratic development in Georgia 
and Ukraine. First, Russia’s shock-therapies against democracy in these countries 
resulted in a strengthened “Otherisation” discourse in these countries. Public de-
bates in Ukraine and Georgia referred to Russia as the hegemon, which had sup-
pressed their genuine and natural development for years, and stressed the chance 
to finally escape from Russian hegemony, to become independent and democrat-
ic. The debates further claimed that Moscow, as an autocratic and imperial power, 
was again trying to suppress Georgian and Ukrainian attempts to acquire genuine 
democracy and independence.
The Otherization seems to serve as an internal nation-building program in 
Ukraine and Georgia. After a series of  crises in bilateral relations with Russia, 
however, the political debate in these states has shifted to more moderate terms, 
which has become a second remarkable consequence of  these developments. 
Once referred to as the “Finlandization” of  these countries, even some ardent 
supporters of  Euro-Atlantic integration have now revised their rhetoric in favor 
of  a more pragmatic cooperation with Russia and, in the case of  Ukraine, even 
advocating the departure from NATO-accession ambitions. Many of  them open-
ly advocate the Finnish de jure neutral foreign policy that has allowed Helsinki 
to develop pragmatic relations with Moscow as an example for their countries to 
follow.
General premises of  the democratic peace theory have mostly pointed to the fact 
that democratic countries do not go to war with each other. However, for further 
research of  the democratic peace theory the following factors should be taken 
into account. First, the international configuration of  the region: the presence of  
former empires, contested regions and / or national minorities who consider the 
neighboring regions their motherland. It should be noted though that probably 
the size, shared history and ethnic similarity of  minorities should be considered 
as an important factor, too. In case of  Georgia, Tbilisi could treat Ossetians and 
Abkhazians as pro-Russian minority and proceeded with the “othering” of  Rus-
sians. But in case of  Ukraine, the antagonistic discourses of  radical Ukrainian 
nationalists, which depicted the pro-Russian, anti-Western rhetoric of  Yanukov-
ich as Kremlin-orchestrated propaganda, failed. It was unacceptable for the wider 
public to accept the claim that half  of  the population of  Ukraine, even the Rus-
sian-speaking one, were spies of  the Kremlin.
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Second, the internal configuration of  new democracies should be considered: the 
evolution of  democratic coalition, institutional set-up etc. Moreover, the evolu-
tion of  the democratic opposition—once it comes to office—should be taken 
into account. In case of  Georgia, the revolutionary trend has increased the risk 
of  conflict. Charismatic personalities take over the power and are tempted to 
apply radical measures to solve the problems, which can lead to destabilization of  
bilateral relations in the region. The rest of  the democratic opposition quite fre-
quently applies revolutionary rhetoric and methods, which makes any pragmatist 
and cooperative dialogue more difficult. In case of  Ukraine, the new democratic 
opposition is not a consolidated political force guided by a charismatic leader, but 
a loose network of  various political parties and public movements, which, in their 
competition for power, are forced to look for new alliances and cooperation with 
other parties. This creates necessary preconditions for compromise, learning and 
non-violent, cooperative behavior and a persistence of  the non-revolutionary 
political culture. The institutional set-up is also an important factor because if  
a democratic revolutionary elite comes to power through the presidential office, 
it has less incentives for dialogue and cooperation like in Georgia. In case of  
Ukraine, various competing actors of  democratic opposition obtained positions 
in various executive and legislative positions with none of  them exercising gen-
eral control over the executive. This forced all the democratic actors to cooperate 
not only amongst each other, but also with their former antagonists.
Last but not the least, the evolution of  former empires should be taken into 
account, because for many of  the new independent states the empire remains a 
serious factor in policy-considerations and one of  their favorite “Others” in pub-
lic debates. Analysis of  this factor can provide explanations to questions ranging 
from why certain security regimes were bound to fail and why the nation and 
state-building programs in new democratic states take one form or another.
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Ukraine—Stuck On The Way To Liberal Democracy?
Eva Elfenkämper
After the break-up of  the Soviet Union, many observers hoped that freedom and 
democracy would soon be a reality for the people of  Central and Eastern Europe 
and beyond. Developments in many countries in the post-Soviet area seemed to 
suggest that these hopes would see fruition. Ukraine apparently also followed this 
path: it started political reforms and gradually opened up its markets, and under 
President Leonid Kuchma signed its first agreements with EU and NATO. 
Ukraine has gone through a phase of  fundamental change and reform since in-
dependence, but it still needs more reforms to become a stable liberal democracy. 
The views on how democracy develops and what can be done by external stake-
holders to assist are about as diverse as the phenomenon “democracy” itself.
One way to look at it is the transition approach, which looks at political processes 
and elite initiatives. This theory stresses the role of  different actors and develops 
four phases of  a historic pattern to explain how a transition to democracy works.
Democracy requires, first, a phase of  “national unity” within a given territory. It 
does not require consensus, just a vague sense of  community. Ukraine has had 
this in different historical movements as, for example, at the beginning of  the 
20th century and reaffirmed it in declaring its independence in 1990. Secondly, 
the country goes through an inconclusive political struggle. An indicator of  this 
phase is a new elite that challenges the status quo which is defended by the old 
elite. The reorganizing of  politics after independence is an example of  such a 
struggle. Thirdly, there is a decision phase, a “historical moment.” This includes 
that the conflicting parties agree on some political, democratic framework which 
gives both fighting parties a role in it. Also in this respect, Ukraine, in the Orange 
Revolution, provides a very good example. Fourthly, the decision phase has to feed 
into a habituation phase to make democracy work. This means that people grow 
accustomed to democracy and accept it as a permanent state. It is also referred to 
as consolidation of  democracy.
This last phase is in its essence an internal process, and different indicators can be 
taken as reference to measure this aspect: division of  power, repartition of  politi-
cal and economic power, civil liberties etc. During the panel debate, we have been 
looking at three external stake-holders who have had a major influence on this 
process: the EU, NATO and Russia. The influence granted to these stakeholders is 
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one of  the aspects political camps constantly fight about, and in consequence this 
disagreement often hinders cooperation in other areas.
Ukraine never obtained a promise of  EU accession, even though it has been 
seeking it for years. Many commentators argue that such a prospect might have 
triggered the ultimate swing towards liberal democracy. While the conditionality 
of  the EU accession process certainly encourages state reform, it would also have 
involved technical and financial assistance to these crucial areas, which help the 
consolidation process. The EU, however, is looking for close ties with Ukraine 
without granting full inclusion, nevertheless the aim of  EU membership is gener-
ally popular in Ukraine. EU membership is perceived as an acknowledgment of  a 
successful transition to democracy, and therefore the EU should ensure continu-
ous close ties with Ukraine, even if  it does not give the full membership yet.
NATO is an external stakeholder, which is controversial in Ukraine. Ukraine and 
NATO’s ties are institutionalized in the NATO-Ukraine Commission and are seen 
by both as an essential part of  the Euro-Atlantic Integration. 
While the cooperation of  Ukraine with both organizations is to be welcomed 
and strengthened, it needs to be balanced with the respective political approach 
towards Russia. Russia still has strong business ties with Ukraine and the Russian 
fleet still has an important base in Crimea. While Ukraine’s relationship with Rus-
sia is not free from tensions, it is part of  Ukrainian reality, and the two will remain 
neighbors no matter what political direction either of  them takes.
While Ukraine will join neither the EU nor NATO in the short term, it is impor-
tant to maintain good relations with them and to include Russia. Russia will always 
remain Ukraine’s largest neighbor and claim a role in Ukraine. Therefore, apart 
from continuing to promote the reform process in Ukraine and having a construc-
tive cooperation with Ukraine directly, a key aspect to further democratic consoli-
dation in Ukraine is a constructive cooperation of  EU and NATO with Russia. It 
will be required in order to avoid additional strains to the internal reform process.
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Democratization through Conflict-prevention and Conflict-
prevention through Democratization
Assessing the approaches of international organizations towards the im-
provement of interethnic relations in Macedonia from 1991–2008
Tome Sandevski
The Republic of  Macedonia was the only country from the former Yugoslav 
Republic to peacefully gain independence from socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
When violent conflicts erupted in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, many po-
litical and academic observers thought that Macedonia would be the next country 
in the Balkans to suffer from large-scale violence.
There was no shortage of  political tensions and violent incidents between Mace-
donians and Albanians in the 1990s, which could have triggered large-scale eth-
nic violence. However, violent conflict did not occur until 2001, when a conflict 
between the Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and Macedonian security 
forces pushed Macedonia to the brink of  war. A diplomatic facilitation process 
between Macedonian and Albanian political parties led by the United States and 
the European Union resulted in the signing of  the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
in August 2001, which put an end to hostilities. The implementation of  the Ohrid 
Framework Agreement was later facilitated and monitored by NATO, the OSCE, 
and the European Union. The Macedonian case is unique in that the international 
organizations which facilitated and monitored the Ohrid Framework Agreement 
were active in Macedonia long before the outbreak of  the conflict in 2001. This 
paper explains the reasons for the success of  preventive measures of  international 
organizations in Macedonia.
The first organization to work on interethnic relations in Macedonia was the Inter-
national Conference on the former Yugoslavia. The Working Group on Ethnic and 
National Minorities became active in Macedonia in December 1991. The working 
group facilitated talks between Albanian and Macedonian political parties, which 
resulted in the creation of  additional Albanian language classes in high schools, the 
establishment of  a television channel dedicated exclusively to broadcasts in minor-
ity languages, the use of  the Albanian language in civil registration and ID cards, 
and an agreement to conduct an internationally monitored census in 1994.
The United Nations deployed the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRO-
FOR) in Macedonia. The mission was mandated to monitor Macedonia’s borders 
Tome Sandevski
 
New Faces Conference 2009 4
Panel III: Democracy and 
Security in the Western 
Balkans
with the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia and Albania. The mission had to report 
any developments that could harm confidence and stability in Macedonia and 
monitored interethnic relations and human rights. It was the first time in the 
history of  the United Nations that a preventive force was deployed to a country 
where a conflict had not yet erupted. UNPROFOR troops mediated several bor-
der incidents. In March 1995 the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
(UNPREDEP) became UNPROFOR’s successor in Macedonia. The mission was 
terminated in late February 1999 when China vetoed the extension of  the man-
date for another six months.
The CSCE launched the Spill-over Monitor Mission to Skopje in September 1992. 
The mission monitored developments at the borders of  Serbia and established 
contacts with the Macedonian government, political parties and ordinary citizens. 
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, 
became active in Macedonia in the early 1990s, conducting 35 visits to Macedonia 
between 1993 and 1998.
Unlike Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, ethnic tensions did not 
result in large-scale conflict in Macedonia in the 1990s. How can this be explained? 
Apparently, both Macedonian and Albanian political elites were receptive to 
conflict preventive measures by international actors. Albanians suffered several 
grievances in Macedonia, but their status was still much better than the status of  
minorities in other parts of  the former Yugoslavia. The situation of  Albanians 
was in no way comparable to the Serbian apartheid regime in Kosovo, which had 
excluded Albanians from public institutions since 1989. The constitutional and so-
cial status of  Albanians was also far better than the situation of  ethnic minorities 
in Central and Eastern Europe or the Baltic states during the 1990s. Compared to 
Serbian and Croatian nationalism, Macedonian nationalism was relatively moderate. 
Likewise, radical ideas and political forces did not enjoy the support of  the major-
ity of  Albanians in Macedonia. This was also due to intra-ethnic party competition 
in Macedonia.
The Macedonian Social Democratic Union formed a government coalition with 
the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) between 1992 and 1998. This 
coalition was succeeded by a coalition between the hard-line Macedonian VMRO-
DPMNE and the radical Albanian Democratic Party for Integration between 1998 
and 2002.
Fights between the NLA and Macedonian security forces took place until August 
2001. According to UNHCR data, some 140,000 people became displaced during 
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the conflict. About 90,000 persons fled to neighboring Kosovo and Serbia, while 
50,000 people became internally-displaced persons. For six months Macedonia 
was at the brink of  large scale ethnic-war. Yet, in contrast to Croatia, Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the international community became involved in the conflict at a very 
early stage. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and the High Representa-
tive for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of  the European Union, Javier 
Solana, travelled to Macedonia several times in the spring of  2001. The EU ap-
pointed François Léotard as special envoy to Macedonia as the European coun-
terpart to the US special envoy James Perdew. International pressure resulted in 
the creation of  a grand coalition of  the two biggest Macedonian political parties 
(SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE) and the two biggest Albanian political parties (PDP, 
DPA) in May 2001.
Prior to the conclusion of  the negotiations in Ohrid, the representatives of  the 
EU, NATO and the United States had put tremendous pressure on the Macedo-
nian government not to declare a state of  war and general mobilization. In addi-
tion, NATO troops closely monitored the operations of  the Macedonian security 
forces. The EU, NATO and the US put pressure on the Macedonian government 
to deter large-scale military operations and the use of  heavy artillery against Alba-
nian insurgents and civilians.
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The Ohrid Framework Agreement, which put an end to the hostilities between 
Albanian insurgents and Macedonian security forces, was signed by the two major 
Macedonian (SDSM, VMRO-DPMNE) and Albanian (DPA, PDP) political 
parties. It featured a set of  drastic constitutional changes: First, the Agreement 
foresaw the development of  a decentralized state. A new law regarding local 
self-government was to be drafted and implemented, which would provide mu-
nicipalities with increased competencies in the fields of  public services, urban and 
rural planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, 
local finances, education, social welfare, and health care. Second, the Framework 
Agreement included articles on the provision of  equitable representation of  ethnic 
minorities in state institutions. Third, it established a double majority require-
ment–the so-called Badinter principle–for the adoption of  laws directly affecting 
the issues of  culture, use of  language, education, personal documentation, and 
use of  symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of  Skopje, 
and boundaries of  municipalities. Fourth, the Agreement enhanced the status of  
minority languages.
Between August 2001 and March 2003, NATO operated three missions in Mace-
donia, which were followed by Operation Concordia. These missions monitored 
the collection of  voluntarily surrendered weapons and provided protection for 
international observers.
The Macedonian case differs from the previous engagement in the former re-
public of  Socialist Yugoslavia in several ways. Most importantly, the Macedonian 
government wanted to join NATO and the European Union. The Partnership 
for Peace and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) were already being 
planned in order to promote the long-term integration of  Macedonia into these 
two organizations. In contrast to Serbia or Croatia during the 1990s, the Macedo-
nian government was very susceptible to external pressures. It was not interested 
in being isolated from the West. Macedonia had the long-term prospect of  joining 
the European Union and NATO. Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Associa-
tion Agreement in April 2001 when first clashes had already happened in Tetovo. 
The three Stabilization and Association reports by the European Commission 
monitored the implementation of  the Framework Agreement between 2001 and 
2002.
The pre-war operations of  international organizations in Macedonia laid the 
groundwork for the quick intervention in 2001. Moreover, after a decade of  
diplomatic, military and humanitarian involvement in the former Yugoslavia, 
international organizations could take advantage of  the expertise of  numerous 
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staff  members, who had gained work experience on the ground. Thus, Macedonia 
offered very favorable conditions for an external intervention. International orga-
nizations supplemented each other in Macedonia, which is why Macedonia is often 
cited as a successful application of  the concept of  interlocking institutions.
Macedonia is a unique case to the extent that virtually all of  the governments 
involved were very receptive to the influence of  international organizations and 
Western governments. Neither the Macedonian political parties nor the Albanian 
political parties had the support of  external actors, which could have actively 
spoiled interethnic relations in Macedonia. The creation of  the National Libera-
tion Army by former KLA fighters was an exception to this. However, the NLA 
leadership decided to disband the NLA and form a political party. This process 
was facilitated by Macedonia’s prospects of  joining the European Union and 
NATO. Also, when Macedonia signed the Ohrid Agreement, it was ahead of  
Kosovo and Albania in terms of  relations with the European Union.
In no other case of  ethnic violence in Eastern Europe did the implementation of  
a peace agreement coincide with the process of  pre-accession to the European 
Union. Both Macedonian and Albanian political elites shared the same goals in 
terms of  full membership in the European Union. In this regard, the Macedonian 
case can only serve as an example for stabilizing interethnic relations in other post-
socialist countries to a very limited extent.
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The European Union in Kosovo—Credibility and Influence at 
Stake
Pascal Fendrich
More than a year after Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence, the situa-
tion in Kosovo remains uncertain. Following Serbia’s and Russia’s oppositions, the 
Ahtisaari Plan, which was expected to set a final status for Kosovo and provide 
a clear road-map for its implementation, was not adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council. Moreover, the EU currently remains divided on the ques-
tion of  independence. Whereas independence is presented as irreversible1 by some 
EU Member States, others still oppose such recognition in the absence of  an 
agreed settlement. Despite these internal divergences, the EU nevertheless emerg-
es as a key actor for the coming period. The promise of  EU membership for 
Kosovo in the long term as well as the decision to create EULEX and to appoint 
an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Kosovo reflects both the central role 
and the long term responsibilities it has itself  committed to. These developments 
have, in parallel, generated expectations from Kosovo’s authorities and population 
that the EU will support the country’s development and even help it make sover-
eignty a reality.
Three distinct but complementary aspects are crucial to assess the EU’s potential 
to successfully channel the reforms necessary for Kosovo’s stability and develop-
ment: Firstly, the EU’s short term priorities in Kosovo and how they relate to one 
another. The way intra-EU divisions impact on the definition of  these priorities 
plays a significant role in this respect. Secondly, the EU’s presence on the ground 
in Kosovo and the current inconsistencies of  the institutional network currently 
in place in Kosovo. And thirdly, the question of  the EU’s longer term influence in 
Kosovo.
Overall, some worrying conclusions can be drawn regarding the EU’s present and 
future potential to bring about stability and development in Kosovo. While theo-
retically endowed with a sort of  “double-conditionality,” the first one being at-
tached to monitoring Kosovo’s post-status developments in the short run and the 
other linked with Kosovo’s longer term EU membership perspective, the analysis 
shows that current circumstances may critically impact on the Union’s long term 
influence.
1 The French President is for example reported to have recently described Kosovo’s independence as irreversible. See: 
Kosovo Media Monitor, UNMIK, 21-2-2008. Even the former EU representative to the troika, Wolfgang Ischinger, 
was also recently reported to have said the status of  Kosovo is definitely solved. See Kosovo Media Monitor, UNMIK, 
12-2-2008.
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The EU’s objectives
While persisting divergences among member states on the question of  indepen-
dence prevent the EU from officially supporting independence and from promot-
ing measures that would make sovereignty a reality, the December 2007 European 
Council conclusions2 as well as the two joint actions of  February 20083 neverthe-
less provide a clear idea about the EU’s agenda. Stability, with an emphasis on 
avoiding internal multi-ethnic tensions–that could in addition have negative spill-
over effects in the region–seems to emerge as the primary objective for the Union. 
This need for stability is accentuated by the remaining uncertainties concerning 
Kosovo’s final status, where communities are still competing to define the state to 
which they belong and its structure. The declaration of  Kosovo’s independence 
furthermore resulted in a legal chaos north of  the Ibar River where courts and 
customs controls temporarily stopped operating.4 These events challenge the EU 
security agenda and imply the necessity to ensure or re-establish stable institutions 
and the rule of  law.
Besides stability as an objective of  paramount importance, the EU is furthermore 
committed to promote Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character, including measures that 
will instill confidence across communities. Doubts persist, however, concerning 
the feasibility and stabilizing effects of  such measures. It needs to be recalled that 
following NATO’s intervention in 1999, security and stability were in practice 
achieved through physical separation of  the communities. In this sense, the EU 
has been faced with already established realities and equilibria on the ground. The 
absence of  an agreed settlement on Kosovo adds another layer of  difficulties in 
this context. The uncertainties attached to the final status of  Kosovo may indeed 
diminish each community’s readiness for compromise. Furthermore, if  concrete 
steps towards independence are not taken, Kosovo’s institutions’ commitment to 
implement measures designed to protect the rights of  the Kosovo Serbs commu-
nity may soon vanish in the fear of  their efforts not being rewarded.
The above observations and this emphasis on stability furthermore carry signifi-
cant consequences for European efforts in the field of  economic development 
and democratization. While both processes clearly feature as priorities on the 
EU’s agenda, the persisting relevance of  security concerns implies a delay for the 
2 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 16616/07, Brussels, 14-12-2007.
3 Council of  the European Union, Council Joint Action (2008/124/CFSP) on the European Rule of  Law Mission in 
Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, Official Journal of  the European Union, L 42, 16-2-2008, pp. 92–98, and Council of  the 
European Union, Council Joint Action (2008/123/CFSP) of  4 February 2008 on appointing a European Union Special 
Representative in Kosovo, in: Official Journal of  the European Union, L 42, 16-2-2008, pp. 88–91.
4 See for example: Kosovo’s Fragile Transition, op. cit., p. 5, or Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in 
Kosovo (Summer 2007–Summer 2008), op. cit., p. 5.
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two objectives. As a matter of  fact, in the absence of  an agreement on the struc-
ture and nature of  the state to be built, democratization efforts can only remain 
incomplete. In the economic realm, recent analyses have also underlined that the 
potential instability of  Kosovo has for the time being prevented foreign direct 
investment to take place.5
Mapping the EU’s presence in Kosovo
There are inherent contradictions in the institutional set-up currently in place in 
Kosovo. While not an EU organization as such, the International Civilian Office 
(ICO) was initially expected to be the central institution in Kosovo’s post-indepen-
dence phase and intended to supervise its final settlement. This initial objective 
is still visible in the design of  the institution. The organization is headed by an 
International Civilian Representative (ICR) that holds authoritative powers. How-
ever, and as it finds its origins in the Ahtisaari proposal, not all EU Member States 
currently support the efforts of  the ICO. In these circumstances, the merging of  
the ICR with the position of  the EUSR entails significant problems. With the ICR 
expected to support measures that would make Kosovo’s independence a reality, 
the EUSR is currently not in a position to do so. The head of  the ICO thereby 
holds two diverging mandates which may in the future clash with one another. 
5 See for instance: Lavdim Hamidi, Foreign Investors Shun Turbulent Kosovo, in: BalkanInsight.com, 2-2-2009, <http://
balkaninsight.com/en/main/analysis/16376/> (24-2-2009).
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Such a dual mandate of  the ICR/EUSR may carry important risks for the com-
prehension and reception of  both the ICO and the EU actions and discourses.
Furthermore, the mandate of  EULEX appears problematic in the current context. 
Initially thought to replace the United Nations Administration in Kosovo (UN-
MIK) and support Kosovo’s institutions in the aftermath of  the independence 
(in the field of  customs, justice or police for instance), current EU divisions have 
resulted in the EULEX mandate being defined as status neutral. In such a con-
text, the EU mission cannot officially coordinate its efforts with the ICO and its 
exact room for manoeuvre regarding Kosovo’s institutions remains to be more 
precisely defined. The potential of  the European Commission as an actor is also 
left to some uncertainties. While it is expected to make use of  community tools to 
promote the economic development of  Kosovo as well as to further its process 
of  European integration, it remains unclear how the Commission can best fulfil 
this task. As enlargement related community tools are designed for states and are 
subject to unanimity in the Council for their activation, the Commission appears 
to be left without the appropriate tools to carry out its mission.
Finally, and in the absence of  any UN Security Council resolution revoking or 
modifying resolution 1244, UNMIK formally stays in place and cohabits with the 
institutions set up to supervise Kosovo’s post-independence period. Despite its 
persisting legal legitimacy, UNMIK seems to have significantly lost its leverage on 
the ground.
Altogether, both the EU and the international presence in Kosovo are problem-
atic and inconsistent. The EU’s “actorness” emerges as dispersed across various 
institutions with differing mandates, leaving the former unable to deliver a clear 
message. Furthermore, the current architecture in place reveals the absence of  a 
clear leadership on the ground, with the EU falling short of  the expectations.
Implications for the EU’s longer term influence
The identified shortcomings may well impact on the EU’s longer term influence 
in Kosovo. The current conditions and lessons learned from previous EU in-
volvements put in question the EU’s potential to emerge as an influential actor in 
Kosovo. With its presence divided among various institutions, the EU is currently 
unable to present a united front and convey a clear message to Kosovo’s institu-
tions and population regarding the future development of  the province. The cur-
rent intra-EU divergences clearly inhibit the formulation and clarity of  the EU’s 
objectives.
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While the EU appears to have been insufficiently prepared to take on its new 
responsibilities in Kosovo, its commitment and the creation of  EULEX have nev-
ertheless generated expectations on the side of  Kosovo’s authorities and popula-
tion, who are now waiting for concrete measures to promote Kosovo’s political 
and economic development. Given the present circumstances, however, the EU is 
unable to express a precise road-map to secure both independence and sustainabil-
ity of  the new state. The lack of  coherence of  EU actions and the potential misfit 
between its capability to act and the expectations it has created may result in the 
questioning of  the credibility of  its commitment.6 Instead of  benefiting from the 
Union’s support, Kosovo’s institutions are on the contrary facing the threat of  see-
ing their efforts not rewarded. Persisting uncertainties about the EU’s final word 
on the question of  independence may well alter Pristina’s strategic calculations 
and priorities and could further contribute to distance Kosovo and its political 
agenda from its European future. If  Kosovo’s European aspirations are answered 
with nothing more than a long term rhetorical commitment and a vague road-map, 
Kosovo’s authorities and population might slowly change their perception of  the 
EU and its policy. The current situation does not only fuel doubts about the EU’s 
capacity to support Kosovo’s development, let alone independence, but also puts 
into question the political will to reach the objectives it had itself  rhetorically com-
mitted to in the first place.
More than a year after its declared independence, the future prospects of  Kosovo 
as well as the EU’s contribution to its stability and development remain uncer-
tain. Intra-EU divisions, the current confusions surrounding its objectives and its 
limited room for manoeuvre on the ground combined with the expectations it has 
generated not only severely endanger the credibility of  its action and erode its le-
verage in Kosovo, but could also negatively impact on the EU as an actor in crisis 
management and post-conflict reconstruction in general.
6 The direct link between the EU’s leverage and the credibility of  its commitment is widely emphasized in the literature. 
See for instance: Solveig Richter and Dusan Reljic, Credibility and Compliance: The EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy Risks Forfeiting its Leverage in the Western Balkans (SWP Comments 32, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), 
Berlin, December 2008.
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Supporting the Stabilization and Democratization Processes 
in the South Caucasus: What Lessons Can Be Learnt from 
the Western Balkans?
Dominik Tolksdorf
With the war in Georgia in August 2008, the South Caucasus region came into the 
international spotlight. The European Union addresses the region with different 
EU Commission instruments (that were complemented by the Eastern Partner-
ship in May 2009) and in the framework of  its CFSP. The EU has been heavily 
involved in the Western Balkans in the last decade and has thus gained much 
experience in supporting stabilization and democratization processes in a fragile 
region in its neighborhood. It can be assumed that it will also get more involved in 
the South Caucasus region, where some political factors are similar to the Western 
Balkans, among them unsettled status issues, unfinished state-building processes 
and the need for reforms (particularly in the security sector).1
Although the Western Balkans and the South Caucasus are hardly comparable,2 at 
least when it comes to the involvement of  the EU, it can be assumed that similar 
strategies will be pursued and foreign policy instruments deployed. Therefore, it is 
useful to identify some lessons from the Western Balkans for the South Caucasus. 
Crucial issues in this respect are 1) the independence process of  Kosovo and the 
EU’s role in it and 2) the process of  police restructuring in Bosnia and Herze-
govina. These two examples will demonstrate that the European foreign policy has 
lacked consistent strategies towards the Western Balkans, which prevented the EU 
from achieving satisfactory outcomes in its neighborhood.
1 There are many indications for this notion. To support the “Six-Point Agreement” of  September 2008, the Council 
decided to deploy a civilian monitoring mission (EUMM) in Georgia whose long-term goal is “to contribute to stability 
throughout Georgia and the surrounding region.” While the European Security Strategy of  December 2003 had already 
stated that the EU “should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of  the Southern Caucasus” 
“the report on its implementation of  December 2008 explicitly alludes to Georgia when it states that “the EU has 
increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict.” A resolution of  the European Parliaments’ plenary 
session on 19-2-2009 concluded that the events in Georgia in August 2008 had shown the need for the clear presence 
of  the EU in the countries of  its Eastern neighborhood (see Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No. 9845, 21-2-2009, p. 4). 
These examples demonstrate that there is the ambition in Brussels that the EU should get more engaged in the region 
in order to support various reform processes (e. g. the reform of  the armed forces, police and gendarmerie, intelligence 
services or judicial and penal institutions). It is therefore not unrealistic to assume that the EU will for this purpose 
deploy further “technical” ESDP missions in the region.
2 Also the reasons for the EU to get involved in both regions are not comparable. For example in the 1990’s, a main 
factor for the European attempts to intervene in the Western Balkans was to avoid the flow of  refugees. This factor 
is certainly not that very relevant when it comes to the European involvement in the South Caucasus. See also Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, Vom Balkan in den Kaukasus, 10-3-2009, p. 6.
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The European Union’s Problems in Addressing Status Issues: The Example of Kosovo
With the establishment of  the UN interim administration mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the support of  various international organizations, a state-building 
process began in the former Serbian province in June 1999. After its declaration 
of  independence in February 2008, Kosovo had been recognized by 60 states 
(including 22 EU member states) in June 2009, which have argued that Kosovo 
is a case sui generis. Mainly for fears of  strong minorities within their own borders 
that might also demand greater autonomy rights, or contestations of  their own 
statehood, EU members Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus (and many 
other non-European states) rejected to acknowledge Kosovo as an independent 
state. The fact that the international community is divided on the issue represents 
a major impediment to an effective EU foreign policy in Kosovo as it limits its 
operational possibilities as envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan.3 Since the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 of  June 1999 is still in force, the International Civil-
ian Office (ICO), which was to completely supersede UNMIK according to the 
Ahtisaari proposal, can only supervise the Kosovo-Albanian authorities. While 
UNMIK, which has adjusted to the new realities in Kosovo by reconfiguring its 
mandate, concentrates on non-Albanian communities in Kosovo, the Kosovo-Al-
banians try to configure the state according to the provisions that originate from 
the Ahtisaari plan (whose provisions are enshrined in Kosovo’s constitution of  
April 2008). The ICO thus contributes to the de facto partition of  Kosovo into 
two parallel societies.
Although divided over the legality of  Kosovo’s independence, the EU mem-
ber states agreed on the deployment of  the EU rule of  law mission EULEX in 
Kosovo. However, Russia only agreed to the EULEX in the framework of  UN-
SCR 1244. Thus, EULEX has to act “status neutral” and not according to the 
Ahtisaari plan. Because of  the operational limits of  the ICO and EULEX, the EU 
has never gained the degree of  influence on the developments in Kosovo as was 
initially envisaged. The EU had to gradually reduce its ambitions and to begin to 
assess its possibilities in Kosovo more realistically. Finally, “the West”, in the long 
run, will have to admit that Kosovo is unlikely to become the multi-ethnic state 
that it was supposed to become according to the Ahtisaari plan.
As the Russian government has for long warned “Western” governments that their 
recognition of  Kosovo’s independence would have serious ramifications for other 
regions in the world, it was no surprise that Moscow acknowledged the indepen-
dence of  South Ossetia and Abkhazia in September 2008. If  the EU becomes 
3 The official term is “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement,” see <http://www.assembly-kosova.
org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf>.
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more active in the South Caucasus region, it will have to deal with these territorial 
issues. Membership ambitions, particularly by Georgia and to a certain degree also 
by Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the different Commission programs give 
the Union some leverage over the governments in the South Caucasus. If  imple-
mented effectively these could help the EU become a mediator in the resolution 
of  “frozen conflicts” in the region. While the EU will not be able to effectively 
mediate in all status conflicts in the region,4 it should get more involved in the 
conflict resolution of  Nagorno-Karabakh, a clearly unified position on these 
territorial issues by all member states being a necessary precondition. Successful 
mediation would finally enable the EU (and other players) to more effectively sup-
port reform processes in the region.5 In this respect, the EU can revert to lessons 
from the Western Balkans. The police reform process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
represents an example of  a rather inconsistent form of  support by the EU.
EU Support for Reform Processes: the Example of Police Restructuring in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Due to the complex post-war situation and the constitutional order created by the 
Dayton Agreement in 1995, reform processes are a sensible topic in Bosnia and 
4 It is very unlikely that the EU will be able to mediate in conflict resolution in South Ossetia and as it does not have any 
leverage on both entities.
5 It can be assumed that the settling of  the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will foster further democratization of  Armenia 
and Azerbaijan that will lead to various reform processes.
German and Macedonian perspectives on Lessons Learned in the Balkans
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Herzegovina, and the latest major effort to reform the constitutional structure 
failed in spring 2006. Despite the fact that the restructuring of  the Bosnian police 
touches this constitutional order, the rather pro-active High Representative Paddy 
Ashdown was able to convince decision-makers in Brussels to include three prin-
ciples for police restructuring into the catalogue of  the EU’s conditions for signing 
a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).6 Besides the condition that 
there is no political interference with operational policing, two of  the principles 
basically envisaged to strengthen the central structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to weaken the entity levels. From the beginning, these principles were contro-
versial not only among Bosnians (mainly the Bosnian Serb parties) but also among 
international actors engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Com-
mission initially argued that a police model based on such principles could not be 
considered a EU requirement as it could not be derived from the acquis communau-
taire, and that also some member states had decentralized police structures. After 
years of  debate, it became clear that there was no chance to convince all Bosnian 
parties to implement these principles. Following a critical crisis between the High 
Representative and Bosnian Serb politicians in autumn 2007, Bosnian party lead-
ers agreed on the principles for police reform.7 These reforms, however, were 
to be implemented in the framework of  the existing constitution, thus respect-
ing the competences of  the two entities. In the absence of  alternatives, the High 
Representative Miroslav Lajčák had to revise and to redraw the ambitious “EU 
standards.”8 Pressure also came from policy circles in Brussels, which argued that 
in the context of  the difficult regional circumstances—Kosovo’s independence 
was to be solved soon—the EU integration process was more important than the 
adherence to the three principles. In the end, the EU gave up on its police prin-
ciples, hoping that they would be implemented together with constitutional reform 
as a merely technical issue. This finally allowed for the Bosnian House of  Repre-
sentatives to approve a police reform in April 2008 and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
to sign the SAA with the EU in June 2008. In the course of  the police reform, the 
EU’s conditionality has lost much of  its credibility as it was no longer impartial but 
open to political negotiations.9
6 See Paddy Ashdown, Swords and Ploughshares. Bringing peace to the 21st Century, London 2007, p. 249.
7 See Mostar Declaration on Police Reform, 29-10-2007, <http://www.eusrbih.eu/policy-docs/?cid=2109,1,1>.
8 Some officials argue that the principles should not haven been termed as “EU principles” but rather as “EU principles 
for Bosnia”, Interviews with EU officials, Sarajevo, June 2008.
9 According to a Bosnian official, when it comes the three policing principles, it was “very unwise from the EU to 
put the bar that high but then to constantly trigger it down. It created a very bad atmosphere in the RS, where EU 
conditionality is considered as relative today. Many politicians from the RS think that many of  the tasks included in the 
European Partnership can be diluted in the course of  the association process.” In fact, since signing the SAA, there has 
not been any progress in any reform field in Bosnia. Interview with Bosnian official, Sarajevo, August 2008.
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Conclusion
These brief  examples demonstrate that a clearly unified position on territorial 
issues among all EU member states is a necessary precondition if  the EU is to 
become more and effectively involved in the South Caucasus. In addition, the EU 
policies will have to be coordinated with other relevant international actors in the 
region such as the U. S., Russia and international organizations like the UN. Un-
fortunately, by imposing “Western” solutions to complex issues in the Western 
Balkans and by rather ignoring the concerns of  those countries that have opposed 
Kosovo’s independence, instruments like the ICO contribute to the de facto parti-
tion of  Kosovo. The case of  Kosovo is a striking example how the EU’s impact 
on the developments in the given countries remains limited if  the conditions of  
unified EU positions and the respect for the positions of  other relevant actors are 
not fulfilled.
However, if  the EU avoids addressing territorial issues in the South Caucasus (for 
example the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) it might face operational limitations 
when engaging in reform processes. As was demonstrated with the example of  
police restructuring in Bosnia and Herzegovina, if  the EU wants to have impact 
on reform processes, maintain its conditionality and credibility and aspires to be 
perceived as a capable foreign policy actor, it should from the very beginning 
define and implement a coherent strategy towards the region including clear goals 
that will not be subject of  change and political games over time.
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A Comment on Democracy and Security in the Western 
Balkans
Bianca Jinga
Following the enlargement of  the EU to include the Central and Eastern Europe-
an (CEE) states, the process of  “democratization” became synonymous with EU 
accession when applied to a European state. Built on the experience of  integrat-
ing the new member states, the EU is perceived as the repository of  an ultimate 
panacea for curing the ills of  bad governance and under-development. In addition 
to that, as a corollary to the democratic peace theory, “democratization” became 
closely associated with strengthening security. In practice, the CEE states joined 
NATO first, and then the EU, after having met the criteria for membership which 
set clear benchmarks for the implementation of  democratic reforms. Equating de-
mocracy with EU membership and security has had implications for the Western 
Balkans in at least two ways: on the one hand the countries of  the region expect 
that the successful implementation of  democratic reforms will lead more or less 
automatically to EU membership; on the other hand, the EU expects that by sup-
porting democratic reforms it will implicitly foster security in the region.
While being different in nature and approaches, the three papers of  the panel 
complement each other, offering a comprehensive overview of  the situation in 
the Western Balkans: Sandevski’s paper undertakes a sound assessment of  sev-
enteen years of  international involvement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of  
Macedonia.2 Fendrich focuses on the EU’s multi-level engagement in Kosovo and 
Tolksdorf  analyses the EU’s involvement in Kosovo and Bosnia in order to draw 
possible lessons learned for a potentially deeper engagement in the South Cauca-
sus. The topics chosen are not just academically challenging, but have significant 
policy implications, as the EU is indeed expected to be a more assertive actor on 
the international scene. Some core assumptions underpinning all three contribu-
tions deserve however some scrutiny.
Firstly, the relationship between promotion of  democracy and EU membership is 
a two way street. Notwithstanding the importance of  the know-how and expertise 
the EU has developed, as well as of  its impressive resources (financial and hu-
man), assessing the effectiveness of  the EU’s transformational power also needs 
to include the candidate countries and their will and commitment to transforming 
their societies. The EU’s assistance counted for a great deal in making the bid for 
1 The views expressed are those of  the author only.
2 From now on referred to by its constitutional name, «Macedonia”, as the author of  the study does.
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membership by the CEE countries which eventually joined the Union a successful 
process. However, it was their genuine desire to join the league of  liberal democ-
racies with functional market economies, and their perseverance in implementing 
rather painful economic and social reforms, which ultimately made EU member-
ship possible.
Macedonia’s success story in defusing an inter-ethnic conflict in the making by 
implementing democratic reforms is as much a consequence of  international 
involvement, in which the EU played an important role, as it is a consequence of  
a series of  policy decisions taken by internal actors: both Macedonian and ethnic 
Albanian political elites shared the goal of  EU membership, they were both recep-
tive to the influence of  international actors and they agreed to integrate the ethnic 
Albanian parties in mainstream political life. Had the efforts of  the EU (and other 
international organizations) not been met by the genuine aspiration of  the inter-
nal actors to normalize inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia, it is unlikely that the 
prospect of  EU membership alone could have led to the same result. The EU can 
provide valuable expertise and financial support, but cannot, by itself, “democra-
tize” a country.
Secondly, EU membership may not necessarily contribute to conflict resolution. It 
is important to identify transferable ”lessons learned” from the Western Balkans 
for a possible deeper EU engagement in the South Caucasus. Both regions are 
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characterized by “unsettled status issues” and “unfinished state-building” pro-
cesses and the EU may find itself  conducting accession negotiations with states 
that may not be recognized either by all of  its members, or by some of  the po-
tential member states (Tolksdorf). One common assumption is that the prospect 
of  EU membership for the countries of  the Western Balkans (and possibly the 
South Caucasus) would positively contribute to conflict resolution. It is important, 
however, to keep in mind that the theory has failed its only test drive so far, when 
Cyprus joined the Union as a divided country.
A third assumption which may be revisited is that, without a status settlement, 
democratization leads to the integration of  ethnic communities because of  a fair 
distribution of  power between them. Although counterintuitive, the opposite 
seems to be validated by reality: the ethnic vote both in Bosnia and Kosovo has 
deepened the gap between the communities, legitimizing a de-facto separation, 
negatively impacting on the security of  the region.
To conclude, prior to looking for “lessons learned”, one needs to revisit some 
basic assumptions, in order to be able to separate theory from facts and to insu-
late the transferable elements underpinning policy recommendations: the EU can 
provide a lot of  valuable help, but it is up to the recipient countries to make use 
of  and to pursue the process of  democratic transformation. EU membership in 
itself  cannot substitute for conflict resolution, and without a political solution to 
unsettled status issues, democratization does not necessarily foster security.
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ENP and post-Soviet Transition in the South Caucasus: 
Triangulating Democracy, Security and Stability
Maria Raquel Freire and Licínia Simão
The Southern Caucasus, including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, is a hetero-
geneous region, demonstrating different political and institutional stages of  devel-
opment, distinct political cultures, and disparate paths in their transition courses 
towards democracy. These countries’ relationships with and towards the European 
Union (EU) have raised numerous interrogations about the applicability, sustain-
ability and viability of  the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in its format, as 
well as its ability to address regional security concerns, both from each of  these 
countries’ and the EU’s perspective. We argue that the specificities of  the “region,” 
along with the international context where the area’s relationships take place, af-
fect and have effect in the transition course in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 
questioning the reach of  the ENP model as it is defined and rendered operational. 
The paper recognizes that the process of  democratic transition is not linear, ho-
mogeneous or irreversible, and it is argued that transition must be understood in 
the interconnection of  the macro and micro levels of  analysis. This encompassing 
framework of  analysis allows for a triangulation of  democracy, security and stabil-
ity, grasping how these concepts interrelate and are mutually affected, with impli-
cations for their implementation.
The EU—an International Security Actor
The EU, as a security community, shares a set of  values and norms built on a soft 
and multilateral approach to security. These soft security areas, where the EU has 
increasingly been gaining relevance, are fundamental as a basis for the Union’s 
involvement at the global level, and for its attempts to export its security and nor-
mative models beyond its borders. These include fostering stability and promot-
ing democratization processes in its neighborhood. In this way, by a process of  
gradual socialization of  security approaches, meaning a set of  norms and values 
allowing an approximation to EU policies, it aims at endorsing an enlarged security 
community in its still much uncertain neighborhood.
In view of  the 2004 enlargement, the EU debated the issue of  avoiding divi-
sion lines in Europe by promoting regional frameworks for cooperation with the 
neighbors, leading to the development of  the ENP. The institutional discourse 
recognizes the danger of  erecting new “walls” in Europe, if  the benefits of  en-
largement are not shared with the neighbors to the East. The EU is thus pursuing 
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a new preventive hands-on approach that is meant to assure the security, stability, 
and prosperity of  the wider European space, without further enlarging the Union. 
However, the EU has revealed great difficulties in developing a coherent approach 
towards the Eastern neighborhood, sustaining its claim to being more than a 
regional and economic player, whose approach presents advantages in securing 
peace and stability in the world. It rests on the Neighborhood Policy to prove that 
the EU can develop an encompassing framework of  relations with its European 
neighbors, which is responsive, both to their expectations and the EU’s current 
challenges and limitations.
The EU and the South Caucasus
The dismemberment of  the Soviet Union had a profound impact on the politico-
strategic policies of  the Caucasus: new states have emerged along with new oppor-
tunities and problems. The collapse of  the artificial unity resulting from the Soviet 
ruling power unleashed old disagreements that, in several places, escalated into 
armed confrontation. Both of  an intrastate and inter-state nature, the secessionist 
conflicts within Georgia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the dispute between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh have been sources of  instabil-
ity in a much disputed region. This context of  instability is further aggravated by 
not only the proliferation of  illegal practices, but also the involvement of  external 
actors, such as the Russian Federation. While in the early 1990s Russia took the 
lead in the management of  the conflicts, today, the lack of  visible results beyond 
the existing fragile cease-fires, to which the war in Georgia in the summer of  2008 
further added, has raised concerns that the status quo might be jeopardizing local 
and regional development.
Broadly speaking, the EU’s approach to the South Caucasus has been a regional 
one, recognizing it as a central step in the economic development of  the neigh-
borhood. However, this approach has been met by an objective differentiation in 
positioning their countries by Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. Thus, the EU contribu-
tion to regional development through conflict settlement and the implementation 
of  democratic reforms should not be a linear and rigid process, but a multi-layered 
and adjustable one. Nevertheless, the question whether the EU has the means and 
the political will necessary to implement such a flexible strategy, and whether the 
Action Plans in the context of  the Neighborhood Policy might be effective instru-
ments for accomplishing the Union’s goals for the Southern Caucasus, remains to 
be seen.
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The EU’s holistic approach to security and stability in the South Caucasus has so 
far been unable to shift local actors’ perceptions about their interests and potential 
gains from engaging in regional cooperation and eventually reprioritizing foreign 
policy goals (the so-called EU’s transformative power). The most important event 
in changing local perceptions has been the brief  war over South Ossetia in August 
2008. Russia’s actions in the South Caucasus led to a reassessment of  the existing 
status quo, proving that Moscow remains a central actor in this region; one with 
whom the EU has been unable to coordinate its actions. Although the slow but 
constant shift of  interests towards the West (EU and NATO) has not been avert-
ed by Moscow’s military intervention in South Ossetia, it illustrated the constraints 
affecting these countries’ foreign and domestic policy choices.
The inclusion of  the Southern Caucasus countries in the ENP came late in the 
process, with the slow implementation of  the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ments (PCAs) and the lack of  progress in conflict settlement and regional coop-
eration prompting a policy review. Behind the decision to include the three South 
Caucasian countries into the ENP lay several important factors, including the pres-
ence of  new advocates for the EU’s interests in the region, after the 2004 enlarge-
ment; Georgia’s peaceful “rose revolution” and its pro-western foreign orientation; 
the inauguration of  the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline; and recognition of  
the strategic importance of  addressing regional instability in the South Caucasus, 
in the context of  the ENP initiative, underlined by the 2003 European Security 
Strategy. The period of  negotiations of  the Action Plans, from 2004 to 2006, was 
marked by close cooperation and increased financial assistance between the EU 
and the South Caucasian countries. The EU appointed a Special Representative for 
the South Caucasus in 2003, and in July 2004 the first EU Rule of  Law Mission 
was deployed to Georgia, demonstrating growing political willingness for a stron-
ger EU presence in the area. From a period of  neglect on the part of  the EU, the 
South Caucasus, and Georgia in particular, became an example of  the EU’s proac-
tive attitude in its neighborhood.
Overview: Triangulating Democracy, Security and Stability in the Neighborhood
The EU understands stability inside its borders as lying primarily within demo-
cratic regimes, guided by the rule of  law and respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, while simultaneously sustaining peaceful relations with other 
states at the regional and international level. The rule, however, is far from being 
a linear co-relation between democracy and stability. If, in the long-term, democ-
racy effectively allows grievances in society to be addressed in a non-violent way, 
creating opportunities for self-development and social progress; in the short-term, 
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democracy entails processes of  power dispute that peacefully accept the outcome 
of  popular referenda. The exclusive reliance on electoral processes to assess the 
levels of  democratic development enhance the focus on short-term strategies to 
gain access to power, by seemingly democratic means. Naturally, the outcome 
can—and often has been—electoral-related violence, resistance to power shifts 
and destabilization of  countries in transition.
The challenge for the EU thus remains to coordinate its values with its security 
interests in the neighborhood, without contradicting them. Partly, the suggestion 
implicit in the ENP is that only by merging the two approaches can the EU have a 
long-term impact in stabilizing its neighborhood. That is, only through democratic 
reforms can the conditions for structural security take root. By shaping the politi-
cal environment in accordance with its own image, the EU is setting the founda-
tions for more peaceful and stable relations, but this process is neither linear nor 
irreversible, demanding that the EU accounts for the short-term needs of  its 
partners, as well as continued and impartial support for genuine reforms, without 
relying too far on rhetoric action.
The stated EU goal to become a pole of  attraction to its eastern neighbors must 
be understood in the context of  the competing forces in action in the broad space 
of  Eurasia. The divergent EU, US and Russian approaches to security and stability 
in Eurasia have imprinted on the region a renewed competition for influence that 
does not bode well for peace and security. The Southern Caucasus countries con-
stitute a visible and urgent element of  a wider engagement of  the EU, in particular 
regarding the definition, implementation and consolidation of  a carefully crafted 
policy towards its eastern neighborhood. However, the conciliation of  interests 
within an EU at 27 states remains a challenge. Despite energy issues being an es-
sential aspect of  EU policies, the Caspian basin only recently became central in 
EU attempts to diversify supplies; despite EU concern over the conflicts of  the 
region, its presence on the negotiations has been limited; despite the recognition 
that regional cooperation in the South Caucasus is essential to find a political solu-
tion to the conflicts, to build trust, and to develop a common basis for coopera-
tion and development, the task of  transforming divergent visions in a convergence 
of  interests seems almost unattainable. 
Conflicts in the South 
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Conflicts in the South Caucasus and their Impact on 
Democratization
Anar Valiyev
Since the collapse of  the Soviet Union and emergence of  new republics, scholars 
have been arguing that democratization is the major tool for solving inter-ethnic 
or so-called frozen conflicts.1 The proponents of  the democratic peace theory 
championed the idea that a solution for any conflict or war could not be achieved 
without the prior democratization of  the respective conflict parties. These scholars 
claimed that the risks of  war (or re-emergence of  war) were reduced by democ-
ratization and exacerbated by set-backs or even reversals in the democratization 
process. Several case studies of  countries that managed to solve an inter-ethnic or 
other domestic conflict through a process of  democratization seemed to support 
this theory. Thus, the so-called causality between democratization and conflict 
resolution was established.
However, there is little research on the possibility that conflict resolution in au-
tocratic countries can lead to democratization of  the respective regimes or, put 
differently, that the processes of  democratization and conflict resolution can 
also work in reversed order. Longevity of  the conflict and the possibility of  a 
resurgence of  frozen conflicts make societies susceptible to the idea of  halting 
further democratization for security reasons. Some authors suggest that, in fact, in 
countries with weak political institutions and low political culture, democratization 
could increase the risk of  war or internal destabilization.2 In addition, literature 
on favorable conditions for successful transition from autocratic structures to a 
democratic system heavily draws on the outcomes of  democratization processes 
in South America, Southern Europe and the former communist states in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Summarizing some of  the main findings on democratiza-
tion in various regions, one of  the central conditions for a successful and peaceful 
transition from autocracy to democracy seems to be the settlement of  national 
and state status questions.3 In the South Caucasus, a settlement of  these questions 
1 Svante E. Cornell, Autonomy as a Source of  Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in Theoretical Perspective, in: World Politics, 
No. 2/2002, pp. 245–276, and Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Danger of  War, in: 
International Security, No. 1/1995, pp. 5–38.
2 Lutz Krebs, Dominic Senn, Judith Vorrath, Linking Ethnic Conflict and Democratization: An Assessment of  Four 
Troubled Regions (National Center of  Competence in Research, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century, Univer-
sity of  Zurich, Working Paper No. 6) Zurich 2007, <http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch/nccr/publications/ 
workingpaper/pdf/WP6.pdf>.
3 Valerie J. Bunce, Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience, in: World Politics, 
No. 2/2003, pp. 167–192.
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cannot be achieved without solving the problem of  the future status of  Nagorno-
Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
After the demise of  the communist system, two distinct approaches to promoting 
and supporting democracy in the former Soviet Union—and especially in the Cau-
casus—were competing with each other. The first approach has been political and 
the second developmental. The former approach proceeds from a relatively nar-
row conception of  democracy—focused, above all, on elections and political liber-
ties. It directs aid at core political processes and institutions—especially elections, 
political parties and politically oriented civil society groups. The second approach 
champions incremental and sustainable change in various sectors of  politics and 
economy. It often gives priority to governance and the “building of  a well-func-
tioning state.”4 The history of  democratic development shows that the political 
approach championed by “the West” not only failed in the Caucasus, but also in 
Central Asia. Perceiving democracy primarily in its procedural aspects as the pos-
sibility to have free and fair elections, the proponents of  this approach overlooked 
underlying socio-economic problems as well as security threats. Kyrgyzstan serves 
as a good example in this respect. Following the path of  democracy after having 
overthrown Akayev’s government in 2005, the country could not overcome its so-
cio-economic and security problems. Fear of  destabilization led to further consoli-
dation of  power in the hands of  incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Thus, 
Kyrgyzstan, after a referendum and parliament elections, slowly moved towards 
becoming an autocratic regime. Similar developments can be observed in the 
countries of  the South Caucasus, where governments and ruling elites are hesitant 
to engage in further democratization efforts fearing the potential eruption of  the 
conflicts in Karabakh, Ossetia and Abkhazia. These conflicts appear to be hang-
ing like the Sword of  Damocles over the societies in these countries. Yet, they also 
undermine the countries’ path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The ‘no peace, 
no war’ condition between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Georgia and Russia has 
had an immensely negative impact on the democratization of  the three Caucasian 
countries. The conflicts put economic and political pressure on these countries, 
impoverish societies and create conditions for the emergence of  organized crime 
on a larger scale. The conflicts also prevent the countries to consolidate as a na-
tion-state and thereby contribute to further instability and insecurity in the region.5
4 Thomas Carothers, Democracy Assistance: Political vs. Developmental, in: Journal of  Democracy, No. 1/2009, pp. 5–19.
5 Vladimir Socor, The Frozen Conflicts: A Challenge to Euro-Atlantic Interests. Report prepared by the German Marshall 
Fund of  the United States, on the Occasion of  the NATO Summit 2004, for “A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the 
Black Sea Region,” Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC, 2004, <http://www.jamestown.org/fileadmin/Vlads_Cor-
ner/policypapers/KonstRon.doc>.
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The reason why the political approach adopted by the European Union and the 
US has largely failed to democratize these countries lies in the hesitation of  the 
Caucasian governments to implement liberal reforms fearing that such reforms 
could weaken their political stance and stability. Indeed, democratization without 
conflict resolution would shake societies in a way that could be instrumentalized 
by internal and external forces. Enjoying democratic rights such as the freedom of  
assembly, no censorship as well as absence of  control of  certain aspects of  politi-
cal life could help these forces to easily manipulate public opinion. At the same 
time, external forces could finance the political parties or organizations to pursue 
agendas going against the interests of  the country. All these factors paired with 
weak political institutions, a feeble political culture and economic instability could 
worsen the situation in the countries. The presence of  the conflict and its pressure 
on both, societies and governments, force the latter to spend more resources on 
militarization and an arms race rather than on institution-building, reforms in the 
education sector and spending on social issues, infrastructure and renovation.
Applying democratization theories to the cases of  South Caucasian countries, 
one can observe that countries in transition to democracies are more likely to 
be involved in wars than autocratic or fully democratic countries.6 In all three 
countries of  the Caucasus nationalism has become a very strong force. More 
democratization could even foster a more belligerent form of  nationalism. To use 
Samuel Huntington’s terminology, the South Caucasian countries suffer from a 
gap between high levels of  political participation and weak political institutions. 
The weaker the institutions, the greater the likelihood that a war-prone form of  
nationalism will emerge in these democratizing countries. Newly democratizing 
countries often experience a weakening of  central state institutions because their 
old institutions have eroded and their new ones are only partially developed. In 
presence of  the frozen conflicts on their territories, this institutional weakness 
results in conditions that are either unable to contain or even encourage hostilities. 
In the face of  this institutional deficit, political leaders rely on expedient strategies 
to cope with the political impasse of  democratization. Such strategies that include 
satisfaction of  nationalist groups as well as war rhetoric of  various factions can 
lead the governments to conduct reckless foreign policies and launch a war.
The existence of  frozen conflicts in the countries of  the South Caucasus and 
particularly the inability of  the Western democracies to solve them has had a 
negative impact on public perception of  democratic ideas in the region. The weak 
and unprofessional response of  the U. S. and EU in the case of  the five-day war 
6 Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War, in: International Organi-
zation, No. 2/2007, pp. 297–337, <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ejohnston/mansfield.pdf>, and Mansfield/
Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
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between Georgia and Russia in the summer of  2008 had negative consequences 
in terms of  the image of  the West and democracy in Azerbaijan. The public has 
been accusing the West of  applying double standards. That was particularly true in 
the public perception of  the Karabakh war and Western support of  Armenia. The 
Georgian conflict hardened this perception since the West was not able to protect 
the country’s young and emerging democracy. In the light of  these experiences, 
the average Azerbaijani could be inclined to question if  the West was ever to come 
to the help of  the Muslim population in a democratic Azerbaijan given its failure 
to do so with respect to a democratic and Christian Georgia in the summer of  last 
year. After the developments in August 2008, it became extremely hard for the 
Azerbaijani public to continue to believe in Euro-Atlantic integration, and Euro-
pean democratic institutions.
In analyzing democratic development in South Caucasus we should therefore not 
neglect the role of  Russia. Sliding towards autocratic systems and remaining the 
hostage of  fear, all three countries follow the scenario drafted by Moscow. The 
Russian policy paradigm with respect to the frozen conflicts can be defined as con-
trolled instability. Russia aggravates the conflicts and then tries to mediate between 
the opposing sides. It is not in the Russian interests to help the countries to solve 
the conflicts since it could undermine the Russian military presence in the region. 
When necessary, Russia fosters the state weakness and instability in the conflicting 
countries, distracting them from the “agenda of  systemic reforms”.7
All three countries continue to remain in the zone of  political turbulence. The lat-
est events in the region including the 2008 August war have turned upside-down 
Western perceptions of  local ethno-political conflicts and the associated pros-
pects for their solution. After the war, the United States and the European Union 
adopted a more balanced stance towards the situation in the region by redefining 
their Russia-first approach. This inspires hope for an equitable, long-lasting solu-
tion based on the principles of  independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of  the involved states.8
The European Union and the United States need to understand the specific char-
acter of  the South Caucasus and assist the countries in coping with their internal 
problems. Resolution of  the frozen inter-ethnic conflicts would eventually have an 
impact on democratic development in these countries. In case of  a successful res-
olution of  the frozen conflicts, the countries of  the South Caucasus might be able 
7 Socor, op. cit. (note 5), p. 2.
8 Ceslav Ciobanu, Moldova and the “Frozen and Forgotten” Conflicts in Post-Soviet States (U. S. Institute of  Peace), 
Washington, DC, 2004.
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to develop democracy even without external help. Failed resolution of  frozen con-
flicts in South Caucasus will consequently lead to the failure of  democratization in 
all countries of  the region. It will create favorable conditions for countries to slip 
into a period of  strong autocratic regimes fostering their power by maintaining an 
arms race and embracing a harsh rhetoric. Such a Cold War in the region could 
eventually spark a new and even more devastating war than the August 2008 crisis.
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Foreign Perceptions of Georgian Democracy: Post-Soviet 
Regional Security Context
George Khelashvili
What is the impact of  foreign involvement on democratization? The present case 
deals with the perception of  Georgian democracy abroad that has influenced not 
only the democratization process in Georgia, but also wider patterns of  regional 
security in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The rhetoric of  democratization in the 
Georgian case was used not as a means of  furthering better governance, but as 
an ideological means that served domestic political ends and reflected ideological 
convictions that were detached from power political considerations. Curtailed de-
mocratization, nevertheless, benefited Georgia and international efforts to further 
more democratic governance in the region must be continued.
Disagreement about Georgian democracy
Georgia was a showcase of  democratic transformation in-between the Rose 
Revolution of  November 2003 and the Russian-Georgian war of  August 2008. 
The perception of  Georgian democracy abroad was extremely diverse, ranging 
from George W. Bush’s famous praise for Georgia as a “beacon of  liberty” to the 
Kremlin’s perception of  Georgian leadership as a dangerous quasi-fascist regime. 
How could perceptions of  the same government be so diverse? The answer seems 
to lie in the ideologization of  the concept of  democratization in the last few years, 
where President Mikhail Saakashvili’s regime has become a geopolitical symbol 
rather than a genuine example of  a progressive regime following a successful 
democratic transformation. Furthermore, this ideologization harmed both Geor-
gia as well as great powers involved in regional politics.
Causes of  this divergence in perceptions by foreign powers, first of  all, the US and 
Russia, were related more to their domestic politics, values and vision of  the devel-
opment of  regional countries’ political systems rather than the two great powers’ 
geopolitical ambitions, as it may appear at a first glance. A common, and largely 
simplified, picture of  two superpowers wrangling about their political influence 
in the region and being preoccupied with expanding their power base is rather al-
luring, except for it does not stand up to a closer scrutiny. The US, European, and 
Russian involvement in Georgian politics have to be considered in this context.
The representation of  the revolutionary Georgian government in two drasti-
cally opposing images by the United States and Russia was due to their respective 
George Khelashvili
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domestic political concerns and understanding of  how regional societies’ political 
systems should be arranged. The US saw regional politics in the post-Soviet space 
in the light of  an expansion of  freedom and democracy. By Moscow, this was per-
ceived as a coordinated attempt by the US and the rest of  the West to undermine 
the Russian regime through a sequence of  democratic revolutions at its borders.
Despite the domestic political origins of  the causes of  these exaggerated percep-
tions of  the transformations in Georgia, the effects of  these diverging repre-
sentations of  reality had important repercussions for all other post-Soviet states. 
These states viewed the “Color Revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine with certain 
ambivalence.
Regional significance
Success or failure of  an apparent Georgian attempt at rapid democratization was 
by no means limited to Georgia itself. Coupled with the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine a year later, Georgia’s peaceful regime change, with subsequent divergent 
reactions from the two most important great powers—the US and Russia—was an 
important milestone in post-Soviet politics.
On the one hand, it was meant to inspire the rest of  the southern tier of  the 
former Soviet Union—the societies of  the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Russia 
itself—that suffered from rigid authoritarian governments. Understandably, the 
anciens régimes all over the post-Soviet space were in jitters after the menacing trans-
formations in their former brotherly republics. Nevertheless, their responses were 
not overtly hostile to the new regimes. This can be explained not only by diplo-
matic etiquette and political considerations. These authoritarian regimes were not 
only pressured from within, but also from without: relationships with Russia for 
many of  them (most notably for Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and even Be-
larus) were far from cloudless and harmonious. Some of  them actually welcomed 
increased US influence in the region to balance Russian predominance.
Therefore, the hopes attached to Georgian (and Ukrainian) regime change were 
not exclusively born by human rights and democracy activists but also by regional 
elites who looked to alleviate foreign pressures increasingly coming from Russia’s 
newly assertive leadership.
Hence, the divergent reactions from the US and Russia to the policies of  the new 
Georgian leadership brought some excitement among the former Soviet repub-
lics. What mattered was the ideologically influenced rhetorical representation of  
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Saakashvili’s case, rather than the actual direction of  transformations and of  the 
state of  affairs within Georgia. In the next few years, especially against the back-
ground of  heightened expectations, the failure of  Georgia to achieve notable 
economic success, dramatic social transformation, democratic governance and 
liberation from the dominance of  Russia (especially in Georgia’s conflict-ridden 
areas—Abkhazia and South Ossetia) did not bring about the desired outcomes for 
either democratic movements or some of  the independence-minded elites in the 
former Soviet space.
Regional security implications
Apart from damaging the prospects of  post-Soviet democratization, the Russian-
Georgian war over South Ossetia had a few significant implications for regional se-
curity. It brought some important lessons to external observers and policy makers. 
However, these lessons do not point in one direction only.
First, it became clear that backtracking on democracy could lead to decreased 
national and, consequently, regional security. A hypothesis that countries in demo-
cratic transition may be more unstable than either consolidated democracies or 
dictatorships was once again vindicated.
Insights from Georgia and Russia on regional security in the Caucasus
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Secondly, the authoritarian elites of  the states in the region became increasingly 
aware that their regimes’ vulnerabilities did not exclusively originate from where 
they thought they were coming from: either from democratic activism encouraged 
by the West or religious fundamentalism. The threat of  regime change now could 
also come from the dominant regional great power—Russia. The previously pre-
dominant assumption—that regime change was pushed or facilitated by the West 
or radical religious movements– was jeopardized by Russia’s overt attempt to push 
for regime change in Georgia during the August 2008 invasion.
Thirdly, basic democratic institutions that had been developed in Georgia in the 
last one and a half  decades contributed to the stability of  the country’s political 
and economic system in the wake of  the disastrous August War, thus allowing it 
not to descend into chaos in the wake of  a military defeat.
Conclusion: democratization and regional security
These lessons invite the conclusion that the ideologization of  the democratization 
process and its subsequent entangling with geopolitics may bring negative results 
for the country in transition as well as outside great powers that have stakes in the 
process, trying to either support or resist democratization. The major reason of  
these undesired developments has been loading the concept of  democracy with 
two additional meanings besides its original promise of  good governance by the 
people for the people. The first of  these meanings is power—that democracy it-
self  was a contagious concept with spill-over effects for the region. This additional 
meaning implied that, first, democracy could be imported and, second, this import 
could have been done by the power of  example alone. Both of  these assumptions 
proved wrong in the case of  Georgia (and also Ukraine) and the whole post-Soviet 
space.
The second meaning with which democracy was loaded has been historicism. 
Democratization was interpreted as an inevitable, teleological process for the post-
Soviet region, which was due to happen as soon as the ferment of  democracy was 
brought in from outside.
What is remarkable about these assumptions is that they were professed, explicitly 
and implicitly, not only by supporters of  the democratization process, i. e. the US, 
but also by its outspoken opponents, i. e. the Russian government. The implicit 
belief  that the spread of  “color revolutions” was inevitable supported much of  
the policy thinking of  Vladimir Putin’s government in the last few years. The 
great powers, the US and Russia, that were involved in the process of  Georgia’s 
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transformation, be it in a encouraging or discouraging manner, both came out 
weakened from the ordeal of  the August War. While US credibility in the post-So-
viet space suffered a setback, Russia’s international reputation was tarnished even 
further, contributing to an acute economic crisis that followed the August War.
Moreover, it became evident that unconsolidated democracies may pose as much 
a regional security risk as authoritarian regimes. However, this conclusion, if  true, 
may not engender unequivocal policy prescriptions. Should the democratization 
attempts continue in the face of  flagging performance of  the “second wave” of  
post-Soviet revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan? Would the results of  
potential conflicts stemming from immediate effects of  democratic regime change 
outweigh the benefits of  long-term democratization? What may be the regional 
security risks associated with the coexistence of  states with divergent domestic 
political structures—most likely, unconsolidated democracies and consolidated 
autocracies?
A tentative answer to these questions may be that pushing for genuine democra-
tization in the region is the only way forward for two major reasons. First, indefi-
nitely maintaining the status quo in these authoritarian states may inevitably produce 
yet another, maybe even larger regional conflagration. Second, as we have seen in 
Georgian politics in the last two years, backtracking on democracy may bring as 
much domestic instability as pushing forward with democratization, as in the case 
of  Ukrainian politics. The inconvenient truth is that the genie of  liberal democ-
racy is out of  the bottle in the post-Soviet space and bringing it back seems to be 
almost impossible. The best way to go forward is to manage the security repercus-
sions of  the spread of  democracy where it takes root.
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Rethinking Democracy and Security in the Caucasus
Sergey Filippov
Twenty years after the fall of  the Berlin Wall, the topic of  democratization re-
mains of  paramount importance for the countries of  the South Caucasus region. 
In its turn, democratization is strongly interlinked with the issue of  security. 
Taken as a whole, developments in these countries in the post-Soviet period have 
been marked by ethnic conflicts and violence, economic distress, unsuccessful 
attempts of  democratization, and rising authoritarianism. Back in 1997, S. Neil 
MacFarlane provided a comprehensive analysis of  interconnections between 
democratization and security in the region.1 One of  his major observations is 
that “rather than playing a proactive role, democratization served primarily as a 
permissive condition opening the way for conflict potential to evolve into war.”2 
A decade later, in August 2008, this conflict potential indeed evolved into a war 
between Georgia and Russia over the breakaway region of  South Ossetia.
South Caucasus at the Focus of Global Geopolitics
Developments in republics of  the South Caucasus in terms of  democratization 
and securitization cannot be understood without the role and involvement of  
external actors. Dutch scholar Mehdi Parvizi Amineh3 argues that the world is 
witnessing a re-composition of  the geopolitical map, whereby Central Eurasia in 
general and the South Caucasus in particular is becoming an arena of  colliding 
interests of  various states. With the rising global energy demand, the Caspian 
region is becoming one of  the most important geo-political areas of  the 21st 
century.4 The contradictory interests of  regional powers, Western powers, and 
transnational corporations around the South Caucasus and the region’s energy 
resources, shape the dynamics and trajectories of  democratization and securitiza-
tion in the region.
The United States is determined to secure itself  a dominant position in the re-
gion, benefiting from its strategic geopolitical location (next to Russia and Iran), 
and for the reasons of  control and security of  the oil and gas resources in the 
Caspian Sea. It can be regarded as part of  the global US agenda to ensure eco-
1 S. Neil MacFarlane, Democratization, Nationalism and Regional Security in the Southern Caucasus, in: Government 
and Opposition: An International Journal of  Comparative Politics 2/1997, pp. 399–420.
2 Ibid, p. 401.
3 Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, Globalisation, Geopolitics and Energy Security in Central Eurasia and the Caspian Region 
(Clingendael International Energy Program), The Hague 2003.
4 Amineh, Towards the control of  oil resources in the Caspian Region, London 2000.
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nomic and geo-political dominance in Eurasia.5 In his seminal book Zbigniew 
Brzezinski brilliantly describes this strategy, “For America, the chief  geopolitical 
prize is Eurasia ... America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long 
and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.”6 
More specifically, one of  the primary interests of  the US in the South Caucasus is 
to secure the safe passage of  oil through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
This increasing role of  the United States in the region of  Russia’s traditional 
dominance (or its “backyard”) is received with caution and suspicion by Mos-
cow. From the Russian perspective, US actions in the South Caucasus consti-
tute another step of  its strategic encirclement7, boosted by earlier plans for the 
installation of  a US anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe. In the Caucasus, Russia 
has been engaged in enhanced military cooperation with Armenia, viewed as a 
Russian ally. The prospects of  the emergence of  US military bases at its borders 
in Georgia, led, inter alia, to Russia’s hawkish rhetoric and joint military exercises 
with Latin American countries.
Another essential player in the region is the European Union. Recent EU enlarge-
ments have extended its external borders to the Black Sea, and hence the Cau-
casus. The EU seeks to promote peace and stability at its external borders and is 
committed to support democratization and enhance security in the region. More-
over, the EU regards the energy issue to be of  paramount importance. As a result 
of  the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes in January 2006 and 2009, the reputation of  
Russia as a supplier and Ukraine as a transit country were seriously tarnished. 
Hence, the EU regards the South Caucasus as an alternative energy supply route. 
The Union is actively involved in the Nabucco, South Caucasus and Trans-Cas-
pian gas pipeline projects.
Last but not least, Turkey is a vital player in the region. The disintegration of  the 
Soviet Union created an opportunity for Turkey to increase its influence in the 
region. As Turkey shares a common culture and history with Azerbaijan, it has 
been a staunch supporter of  its efforts to preserve territorial integrity and to real-
ize the economic potential arising from rich natural resources. The Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline is a prime example of  cooperation in the energy sphere. On the 
other hand, the relationships with Armenia are strained by the question of  the 
Armenian genocide of  1915–1923.
5 Dan Jakopovich, The 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia: A Case Study of  High Politics and Rank-and-File Execution, 
in: Debatte: Journal of  Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 2/2007, pp. 211–220.
6 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, NY, 
1997, p. 30.
7 Editorial, Russia and the West: The end of  the honeymoon, in: Strategic Survey 1/2004, pp. 116–129.
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Frozen Conflicts as a Threat to Security
As MacFarlane rightly argues, “the political opening of  the late Soviet and 
post-Soviet eras was an important source of  insecurity in the region in the early 
1990s.”8 Indeed, nationalistic rhetoric came to substitute the Soviet one in the 
period right before and soon after the demise of  the Soviet Union. In these cir-
cumstances, the inter-ethnic tensions which were controlled by the Soviet regime 
sparked with renewed force.
“Frozen conflicts” represent a very particular feature of  the South Caucasus. The 
essence of  the problem lies in the internal borders within the Soviet Union that 
were arbitrarily and artificially drawn by Soviet leaders9. Under Soviet rule, the ad-
ministrative-territorial division in the Soviet Union was not high on the political 
agenda, and only the external borders were of  concern for the Soviet leadership.
Administrative borders in the Soviet South Caucasus only partially corresponded 
to the ethnic composition of  the territories. Robert Service in his biography of  
Joseph Stalin10 explains, why Nagorno-Karabakh, largely populated by ethnic 
Armenians, became part of  the Azerbaijani SSR, and not of  the Armenian SSR. 
According to him, the Soviet Union had far-reaching plans concerning Turkey, 
wishing it would develop as a communist state. Needing to appease Turkey, Stalin 
agreed to an administrative division under which Armenian-populated Nagorno-
Karabakh would be under the control of  Azerbaijan. In the case of  Abkhazia, in 
1921 the Bolsheviks made it a Socialist Soviet Republic with the ambiguous status 
of  a treaty republic associated with the Georgian SSR. Later, in 1931, Stalin made 
it an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR.
As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate at the end of  the 1980s, ethnic tensions 
grew between the Abkhaz and South Ossetians on one side and Georgians on 
the other. These minorities feared that Georgia’s independence would lead to the 
abolishment of  their autonomy, and they insistently expressed their determina-
tion to leave the Georgian SSR, but to stay in the Soviet Union as separate SSRs. 
These tensions led to violent clashes and victims on both sides. Mostly for similar 
reasons a military conflict erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh.
8 MacFarlane, op. cit. (note 1), p. 400.
9 For example, in 1954, the Soviet leader of  Ukrainian origin Nikita Khrushchev initiated a transfer of  the Crimea 
region from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR. Needless to say, no referendum was held and the population was 
not consulted. Till now, the Crimea peninsula remains a thorny issue in the bilateral Russian-Ukrainian relations. 
10 Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography. Cambridge, MA, 2004.
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The rush of  the Soviet Republics’ elites for independence from the Soviet Union 
(including the Russian SFSR itself) and the subsequent hasty dismemberment 
of  the Soviet Union made peaceful negotiations on the state borders of  newly 
emerged countries impossible and led to violent conflicts in the disputed regions. 
Most hostilities were effectively stopped with active Russian involvement and me-
diation. Moscow seeks to ensure stability at its borders, and is engaged in peace 
negotiations. The Kremlin offered a peace solution for Transnistria in 2003; it 
has been actively involved in the OSCE Minsk Group negotiating a political 
settlement of  the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh; and it deployed its peacekeep-
ing forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On the other side, it has been widely 
suggested that Moscow’s involvement in the settlement of  the frozen conflicts 
was rather destabilizing. For instance, Anar Valiyev develops the argument that 
Russia is a party of  and arbiter to the conflicts, and sees the goals of  its policies 
as ‘controlled instability’ whereby Moscow fosters state weakness in the target 
countries and prevents them from democratization and development of  organic 
ties with the West.11
Moscow had always abstained from recognition of  independence of  the de-facto 
independent breakaway regions. However, the Kosovo precedent and the deci-
sion of  Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to launch a military offensive on 
civilians in Tskhinvali provided the Kremlin with both legal and legitimate justifi-
cation of  the recognition of  independence of  both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Unsurprisingly, this move was met by condemnation from Western countries, 
NATO, OSCE and the European Council.
To sum up, democratization, security and stability in the Caucasus cannot be 
achieved without a just, democratic, peaceful and lasting settlement of  the “fro-
zen conflicts.”
Democratization
It is increasingly understood that the unresolved status of  the frozen conflicts 
represent an impediment to democratization. Frozen conflicts, coupled with the 
perceived Russian threat, are used as a justification for the curtailment of  civil 
liberties and freedoms by the authoritarian regimes of  the South Caucasus.
By and large, the record of  democratization in the South Caucasus has been 
quite poor. While the authoritarian rulers are paying lip service to democracy, 
their actual steps on the democratization path have been quite modest. Human 
11 Anar Valiyev, Frozen Conflicts and Their Impact on Democratisation in South Caucasus (Paper presented at DGAP 
12th New Faces Conference. Prague, 16–18 March 2009); summary here pp. 67–72.
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Rights Watch recorded numerous evidence of  brutal suppression of  the opposi-
tion, torture, existence of  political prisoners, violations of  freedom of  assembly, 
crackdown on free media and other limitations of  civil liberties and human rights 
in all three republics12. The most recent example is the change of  Azerbaijan’s 
Constitution with the referendum on the 18th of  March 2009, whereby the limits 
of  presidential terms were effectively scrapped, allowing President Ilham Aliyev 
(who inherited the presidency from his father) to stay in office for life. The West 
remained silent on yet another authoritarian move, whereas the same type of  ref-
erendum in Belarus in 2004 was widely denounced by Western democracies and 
international media.
Georgia has been portrayed as an example of  successful transformation towards 
a democratic state. However, the picture of  the Rose Revolution is not that rosy. 
It is widely argued that the “Rose Revolution” was a product of  US involvement 
in the region, rather than genuine democratization. Dan Jakopovich13 claims that 
the principal elements of  the opposition against Eduard Shevardnadze were 
trained and financed by the US government and mainstream US NGOs. More 
specifically, the youth movement Kmara (“Enough”) which was instrumental in 
bringing down the Shevardnadze regime, was funded, among others, by Freedom 
House, USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, George Soros’ Open Soci-
ety Institute and others.14 President Saakashvili implemented successful democrat-
ic and free market reforms at the beginning of  his presidential term, yet moved 
towards authoritarian rule rapidly afterwards.
While the US has sought to promote its interests in the South Caucasus through 
the support of  local NGOs, the European Union has been promoting democ-
ratization by the means of  clear and transparent programs. Maria Freire and 
Licinia Simão15 provide a comprehensive analysis of  the evolution of  EU policies 
towards the region. The EU has been projecting its soft power based on a sta-
bilization approach; Partnership and Cooperation Agreements were signed, and 
progressively the countries were included in the European Neighborhood Policy.
12 Armenia: <http://www.hrw.org/en/europecentral-asia/Armenia>; Azerbaijan: <http://www.hrw.org/en/europecen-
tral-asia/Azerbaijan>; Georgia: <http://www.hrw.org/en/europecentral-asia/georgia>.
13 Dan Jakopovich, The 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia: A Case Study of  High Politics and Rank-and-File Execution, 
in: Debatte: Journal of  Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 2/2007, pp. 211–220.
14 Graeme P. Herd, Colourful Revolutions in the CIS: “Manufactured” versus “Managed” Democracy?, in: Problems of  
Post-Communism 2/2005, pp. 3–18.
15 Maria Freire and Licinia Simão, Democratisation and Security in Central and Eastern Europe (Paper presented at 
DGAP 12th New Faces Conference. Prague, 16–18 March 2009); summary here pp. 63–66.
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Prospects
The highly complex and volatile situation in the South Caucasus is shaped by 
diverging interests of  global and regional powers, states and breakaway regions, 
elites and societies. Russia, being an influential player in the region, remains 
adamant on the issue of  potential NATO membership of  these republics and 
perceives the US role in the region as a threat to its national security. Percep-
tions of  the Russian leadership were vividly described by Cohen in 2006: “Russia 
today is determined to prevent Georgia and the Ukraine from joining NATO. 
The Russian military feels that it is losing face by being pushed out of  its former 
Soviet dependencies—first from its Georgian military bases, then from Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, and eventually from the dachas and sanatoria along the Black Sea 
coast.”16 However, Moscow has not shown visible opposition to the European 
future of  the South Caucasian republics, clearly separating potential NATO and 
EU memberships. Nicolas Sarkozy’s mediation on behalf  of  the EU was instru-
mental in ending hostilities in August 2008. It is expected that the EU will contin-
ue to play its role of  a peace broker in the South Caucasus and serve as a model 
of  democratization.
Overall, it emerges that the solution to the complex problems faced by the South 
Caucasus should be based on several principles, including guarantees of  security 
to the populations of  the South Caucasus, renewed efforts at genuine democrati-
zation, respect for minority rights and respect for territorial integrity in line with 
international law and UN resolutions, and possibly a neutral status of  the region.
16 Ariel Cohen, Preventing a Russian-Georgian Military Confrontation (The Heritage Foundation), <http://www. 
heritage.org/research/russiaandeurasia/wm1024.cfm>, Washington, DC, 2006.
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Beyond the Democratic Theory: Exploring Authoritarian 
Liberalisms in Central Asia
Assel Rustemova
There is a seeming paradox with regard to democratization processes in Central 
Asia. Political regimes in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have become politically 
more authoritarian and economically more liberal. This process is prominent not 
only in Central Asia, but exists with some reservations in the Caucasus and most 
notably China. Contrary to the arguments that foresaw a rapid democratization in 
these countries at the beginning of  the 1990s, the underlying theory collapses in 
the light of  multiple definitions of  political and economic liberalisms. By treat-
ing liberalism as a practice one could argue against generalized terms and trace 
discontinuities and a multiplicity of  models to the different relationship of  a state 
towards its population. Such a framework is based on Michel Foucault’s concept 
of  governmentality, which allows for the examination of  how governments decide 
to position themselves in and vis-à-vis society. Some relate to their population in 
a paternalistic manner, while others see themselves solely as administrators and 
managers. This positioning produces a different set of  economic and political 
practices, or, in the language of  Foucault régimes.
Against this background, the priority of  economic growth and development over 
other political ends allows the governing elite in Kazakhstan to de-politicize 
genuine political problems and frame them as technical and a matter of  skill. As 
a result, democratization is perceived as a challenge that threatens economic 
stability and brings nothing but poverty to countries that follow it. In Uzbeki-
stan, a different version of  governmentality can be observed where political and 
economic liberalism are stripped from their original meanings and inverted to 
support a strong, controlling and paternalistic state. This positioning does not 
tolerate any threat to the “collective” efforts of  building a better future for all 
and operates within the ideological scheme that has been copied from the Soviet 
Union. Local state controlled media presents democracy as redistributive justice, 
which promotes the existence of  strong states with large bureaucratic appara-
tuses; it also fosters paternalism and the dependency on state salaries by a large 
proportion of  the population. In conclusion, a more nuanced approach that 
examines the mode of  governmentality in each country illuminates the variety of  
authoritarian liberalisms.
Assel Rustemova
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The State of Democratic Theory and Governmentality
As a starting point, this analysis builds on the assumption that we currently expe-
rience a tremendous transformation of  our world away from modern structures 
towards post-modern politics and mechanisms of  governance. Much has been 
written about how postmodernism alters democracy, which is conceptually still 
based on the old-fashioned structures of  modernity. There are two strategies by 
which contemporary scholars of  democratic theory try to capture radical politi-
cal and economic changes. Both strategies, however, are flawed because they 
make use of  old concepts and definitions. The first group of  scholars prefers to 
develop “thought experiments” and invent new definitions of  democracy. As a 
result of  such an enterprise we are faced with terms like Chantal Mouffe’s agonis-
tic, Charles Taylor’s communitarian, Habermas’ deliberative, and Hirst’s associa-
tive democracies. None of  them are, however, implementable in practice, because 
they depend on a social setting that would require a significant shift in the po-
litical build-up of  contemporary (democratic) societies. On the other hand, we 
also find sociological accounts of  postmodern politics, in which scholars claim 
the absence of  democracy in today’s political scene which, according to them, is 
a “postmodern, neoliberal, techno-oligarchic governmentality” (Gabardi) or a 
system of  “practical anti-humanism” (Althusser).
Yet, none of  these explanations could address a paradox that we observe in 
Central Asia, where both Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, are 
becoming highly authoritarian, but economically more liberal. As a result, con-
temporary democratic theory needs to theorize the economy and secondly, ac-
count for the definitive role of  government in the democratization process rather 
than accepting a bottom-up approach which focuses largely on civil society and 
neglects to take into account the existing governmental structures. The purpose 
of  the analysis that is put forward here is thus the provision of  a framework that 
retains the critical edge in both economics and politics while showing how two 
distinct realms are related and interlinked with each other. As a result, I re-con-
ceptualize Authoritarian Liberalism as highly centralized authoritarian political 
systems that aim to implement economic market principles as a way to show vari-
ous strategies of  how states cope with the challenges of  the post-modern world. 
I treat governing not as a simply political endeavor, but as an art of  balancing 
competing logics of  democracy which seek to promote the values of  equity and 
economics that promotes the values of  efficiency. These contradictory logics 
invert the nature of  the political into a “play between the totalization of  modern 
bureaucratic institutions and the individualization of  people through capital-
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ist commerce and personal consciousness.”1 The rationale of  governance can 
either rely on modern juridical coercive institutions of  states or take a different 
approach in relying on incentives and competition while fostering circulation of  
goods, services, ideas, etc., and an economy of  exchange. Therefore, Foucault’s 
description of  two styles of  governmentality seems to be fruitful for the analy-
sis of  Central Asia in order to assess how the positioning of  a state in society 
shapes economic and political processes. It is not to say that the two styles of  
governmentality that I assess here are the ideal-types and do not overlap. On 
the contrary, both are highly intertwined and exist simultaneously, however, we 
can discern proclivities of  governments in particular “issue areas” towards the 
chosen style.
Case Studies of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
For instance, if  Uzbekistan sees itself  as a paternalistic redistributive state it will 
a) set out a vision for development that everyone has to comply with; b) it will 
not allow its citizens to risk their well-being in the open market. Instead, it will 
provide for its people and boast indicators of  social spending. We notice a sway 
into totalization of  bureaucratic institutions that control population. The ideal of  
a state as an embodiment of  justice and fairness that redistributes resources to 
1 Philip Cerny, The Governmentalization of  World Politics, in: Eleonore Kofman, Gillian Youngs (ed.), Globalization: 
Theory and Practice, New York, NY, 2008.
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the needs of  every individual through centralized control over national economy 
contradicts the ideals of  liberal democracy in the following ways: first, it assumes 
a malleable, obedient citizen under the strong enforcement of  rules and laws. It 
treats individual resistance as a threat to all and most importantly a threat to the 
well-being of  the whole nation.2 Under these circumstances, the Uzbek govern-
ment launched a negative campaign again liberal democratic practices. Specifically, 
the Uzbek government identifies two major flaws in the ‘unjust’ version of  de-
mocracy: lack of  physical security and social protection. President Islam Karimov 
argued for the non-applicability of  Western political systems based on the separa-
tion of  powers and defended the need for the superiority of  the executive branch 
as a premise for “fulfillment of  laws, protection of  freedoms and implementation 
of  political and economic reforms.”3
Accordingly, he claims that true democracy is only possible if  it “protects inter-
ests for all layers of  the population.”4 In 1992, Karimov wrote “Our goal is… 
to create such a structure which would allow securing economic and political 
independence [for] Uzbekistan.”5 As a result, the primary role of  the state is its 
welfare function towards society, which acts as a recipient of  protection from the 
paternalistic state. In Uzbekistan, the logic of  governance despises democracy 
as an unfair and unjust political system, because of  its individualistic nature that 
forces everyone to accept a disorderly fashion and risk vis-à-vis one’s livelihood 
and well-being. Instead, by supporting a strong state that provides for the people 
who work for the benefit of  a common good and social justice, authoritarian 
Uzbekistan legitimizes policies as being morally superior to Western values and 
policies.
On the other hand, Kazakhstan’s government sees itself  as a manager in soci-
ety that operates on its own within market conditions that are maintained by 
the state. According to this logic, economic growth becomes the key goal of  
the whole society and hence the state purposefully does not interfere directly 
into the economy, but regulates it indirectly via incentives and competition. In 
managerial style, citizens cannot be dependent on the state. Instead, managerial 
governmentality envisions a break with “the old system” by fostering a liberal 
2 Uzbek Leader: Corrupt Officials “My enemies,” in: BBC Summary of  World Broadcasts, 11-9-2001, available via 
<http://www.lexisnexis.com> (accessed 2-12-2008). Among the most recent ones is: Uzbek Leader Rebukes Central 
Region’s Top Officials for Low Efficiency, in: BBC Summary of  World Broadcasts, 17-4-2008, available via <http://
www.lexisnexis.com> (accessed on 2-12-2008).
3 Press Service of  Uzbekistan’s Government: Annotation to the First Collection of  Works by I. A. Karimov Uzbekistan: 
National Independence, Economy, Policy, Ideology, <http://2004.press-service.uz/eng/knigi_knigi_eng/knigi_eng3.
htm> (accessed on 10-5-2008).
4 Ibid.
5 Karimov, Islam, O’zbekiston – o’z istiqlol va tarraqiyot yoli. Collection of  works Uzbekiston – buyuk kelajak sari, 
Tashkent 1998, p. 53.
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market economy based on principles of  efficiency and utility: “the new role of  
the government now consists not in making decisions for the people, but first 
and foremost in creating the conditions under which free citizens and the private 
sector can undertake effective measures for themselves and their families.”6 The 
government envisions the state’s role as providing the conditions for a decent 
standard of  living, such as being able to provide for one’s family, own a home, get 
a good education and health care, and accumulate funds for retirement. And even 
though these priorities are set out by the president, individual citizens to a large 
degree are responsible for their own success or failure. The assumed sway to indi-
vidualization without strong law enforcement is premised on a fragile equilibrium 
of  the successful delivery of  the model.
Democracy in such a state is associated with fracture and instability that might 
negatively impact the fragile market system. The strategy of  the government is 
not to deny freedoms of  individuals as such, but to turn truly political issues into 
technical “problems.” The managerial style of  governmentality precludes the 
establishment of  a liberal democratic regime for several reasons. First of  all, it al-
lows for the existence of  diversity only insofar as it supports economic exchange 
and growth without addressing the issues of  redistribution, recognition or repre-
sentation. Secondly, liberal democracy will always challenge the people in power 
by calling free and fair elections, which, according to the government, threaten 
the success of  the whole economic project in place. We hear that it is bad to 
“change the helmsman in the middle of  the journey.” Specifically, the Kazakh 
government has claimed that instability will increase risks and deter foreign inves-
tors from coming to invest in Kazakh markets. Low FDI will slow development 
of  oil resources and the diversification of  the national economy. If  that were 
to happen, unemployment and inflation would turn the suggested plan towards 
more prosperity into a vicious circle of  a persistent economic downturn. The na-
tional and state-controlled mass media therefore loves to publish examples from 
countries of  ‘colored revolutions’ where results have been, least to say, dubious.
To sum up, Uzbekistan sees itself  as a paternalistic redistributive state. Democ-
racy for such a state is void of  the liberal meaning and dressed into the rhetoric 
of  redistributive justice. This type of  authoritarian liberalism emphasizes bu-
reaucratic totalization and a paternalistic style of  governmentality. On the other 
hand, Kazakhstan’s government sees itself  as a manager in society that operates 
on its own within market conditions (of  competitiveness) that are maintained by 
the state. Democracy in such a state is seen as a challenge to the existing market 
6 Nursultan Nazarbajev, Kazachstan 2030: Prosperity, Security and ever growing welfare of  all the Kazakhtanis Almaty 
(Kazakhstan), 2007, <http://portal.mfa.kz/portal/page/portal/mfa/en/content/reference/strategy2030>.
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structure—a structure that brings economic material benefit to all people. Au-
thoritarian liberalism in Kazakhstan facilitates individualization and a managerial 
style of  governmentality. Within these conditions, both regimes defend political 
authoritarianism by criticizing two problems that the procedural liberal democ-
racy is unable to solve. One is the problem of  political and economic stability and 
the second is the problem of  social and economic inequality.
Public Communication and the 
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Controlling the Uncontrollable—Public Communication and 
the Effectiveness of Democracy Promotion
Alexander Wolters
Programs of  democracy promotion run in Central Asia have all too often re-
sulted in failure to initiate lasting progressive change. In Kyrgyzstan, like in most 
of  Central Asia, projects for promoting democracy rarely show lasting effects. At 
best they only waste resources and occasionally provide work for some as long as 
the project continues, at worst they contribute to the reproduction of  informal 
institutions and exacerbate existing local cleavages. To enhance the effectiveness 
of  democracy promotion and development cooperation in general specific con-
trol mechanisms are set into force. Two central different “modes of  control” are 
of  special importance here.
The first, politico-administrative mode of  control refers to measures that are 
related to the obligation of  any development organization to directly or indi-
rectly answer to a political superior. Usually such superior is a parliament which is 
responsible to guarantee oversight over the activities of  organizations that imple-
ment development aid. In most cases, the corresponding organization would be a 
ministry, in the case of  Germany the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. The ministry distributes money from the federal budget to ex-
ecuting agencies, with the biggest shares going to the German development bank, 
the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), and the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammen-
arbeit (GTZ) in the case of  Germany. From here aid is channeled to contractors 
and subcontractors before it finally reaches the recipient, either in form of  loans 
and grants or in form of  material or knowledge support. The transfer of  aid 
from one place to another is characterized by an incomprehensible web of  do-
nors, contractors, partner organizations and complicated cooperations between 
all actors involved.
Since superior organizations are usually limited in their resources for controlling 
the subordinates, the problem of  information aggregation arises. Parliamentari-
ans in the German Bundestag, for example, have neither time nor sufficient materi-
al resources to guarantee full control over the ministry’s activities. The same holds 
true for the relationship between the ministry and the KfW and GTZ. At every 
juncture between controller and controlled the problem of  information aggrega-
tion is repeated. How do organizations try to solve this problem? According to 
Alexander Wolters
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Thomas Carothers,1 USAID headquarters personnel strongly believes in quantita-
tive data aggregation, i. e. the representation of  realities in numbers. Numerical 
representation secures the easiest way to process information. In accordance with 
that belief  much time is spend on the development of  indicators that allow for 
an encompassing reproduction of  the realities on the ground in numbers. How-
ever, although more and more sets of  indicators are being invented, the effects 
of  control remain limited. The question arises how projects that aim to enhance 
civil society or the professionalism of  parliament assistants can actually be trans-
lated into numbers. Too often the realities on the ground seem too complex to be 
represented in a set of  digits.
This problem is illustrated by a short case study on the TACIS program, which 
attempts to support decentralization in the Kyrgyz Republic. Even though the 
project must be considered a failure, when realities on the ground change too 
rapidly and in an unfavorable direction, the organization’s final report mentions 
mostly successes by counting the numbers of  workshops held, trainings con-
ducted, papers produced and equipment distributed. The form of  information 
aggregation assists in the obscuration of  realities and allows for the undetectabil-
ity of  project failure.
The second mode of  control discussed in the paper is the economic mode of  
control. Organizations implementing development aid are forced to survive in 
a market environment in which the competition for grant money from donor 
organizations is strong. No contractor can afford to fail in its activities, since 
such failure would damage the organization’s reputation and result in exclusion 
from subsequent calls for tendering. This pressure translates into the necessity to 
produce success stories; if  not in reality, then at least on paper. Cooley and Ron 
analyze the impact of  market conditions on bargaining between contractors and 
partner organizations in recipient societies.2 Market conditions plus the multiplic-
ity of  principal contractors and only few capable recipient partner organizations 
(agents) lead to a distorted bargaining game. The partners are in the position to 
dictate conditions and to handpick the contractor out of  a number of  organiza-
tions. The contractors (principals) on the other hand are forced to deviate from 
the project’s objectives and forced to undermine the project’s goals for the sake 
of  winning a partner (with particularistic interests), since without his coopera-
tion a successful project implementation is impossible. In the end, market forces, 
1 Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad. The Learning Curve (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 
Washington, DC, 1999, pp. 287–297.
2 Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO Scramble. Organizational Insecurity and the Political Economy of  Tran-
sitional Action, in: International Security 1/2002, pp. 5–39.
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promoted with the aim to enhance organizational effectiveness in the sphere of  
development aid, lead to distortions in the process of  project implementation.
At the same time, the realities on the ground are obscured. There is an apparent 
paradox within the development discourse and its significance for practices of  
development aid. Rottenburg3 describes an unavoidable contradiction between a 
modern and a postmodern element in the discourse on development. The mod-
ern element introduces an inequality between a developed and a developing part 
of  the world. In contrast to such inequality, a postmodern element calls for equal 
representation in a setting of  cultural heterogeneity. Cultural self-determination 
demands self-determined development which means that the recipients know 
best for themselves if  and how to develop. However, although development se-
mantics have taken notice of  this change of  perspective and introduced concepts 
of  cooperation and partnership, the contradiction nevertheless remains. Only if  
notions of  inequality are introduced, we are able to identify “developed” knowl-
edge and transfer it from one place to another. In the end, the modern element in 
development discourse determines the frame for development cooperation and 
thus undermines the principle of  equal representation.
This seemingly unavoidable paradox presents the main challenge to effective de-
velopment cooperation: if  clear guidance for development cooperation is inhibit-
3 Richard Rottenburg, Weit hergeholte Fakten. Eine Parabel der Entwicklungshilfe, Stuttgart 2002, pp. 217–241.
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ed and if  introduced mechanisms for control do not result in increased effective-
ness, what can be done to improve development-aid and democracy promotion? 
Rottenburg, accepting the limits for improvement caused by what he calls the 
technical game (the materialization of  the modern element), calls for more room 
for communicative maneuvering, for more integration of  heterogeneous perspec-
tives into the homogeneously structured technical game. Negotiations between 
representatives of  different cultural backgrounds need more (communicative) 
space to allow for more adequate representation of  cultural heterogeneity at the 
bargaining table.
In light of  these problems, the idea of  a public serves as a possible corrective 
mechanism. Conceptualized as a social system, the public might serve as an 
unlimited communicative space which allows for the unconditional initiation of  
communication. Since the system’s own structures decide which communica-
tion to continue, no guarantee is given for the success of  initiated communica-
tion. However, the opportunity for unconditional initiation of  communication 
exists and is worth further consideration. A key question concerns the interplay 
between the corrective mechanisms and the two modes of  control. Certainly, the 
public’s function to structure free flows of  communication runs counter to the 
rather information sensitive operations of  market or administrative organizations. 
Public attention paid to such operations is considered to be disturbing by these 
organizations. However, public attention, i. e. communication about organiza-
tions’ activities, does not automatically bring operations to a standstill. In fact, 
organizations tend to react to such disturbances by developing new strategies of  
public relations or, in the case of  market organizations/businesses, new concepts 
of  corporate social responsibility. The contradictory moment between the two 
modes of  control and the public, as a possible third mode of  control, seems to 
be merely taking place on the level of  operations, rather than being a systemic 
contradiction.
The public could hence function as a possible corrective mechanism that allows 
for enhanced maneuvering and more equal representation and integration of  
heterogeneous cultural perceptions within the development discourse and its 
outcome in form of  strategy formulation and program development. Radical-
izing Rottenburg’s idea about necessary room for maneuvering at the bargaining 
table the public here is conceived as an alternative mode of  control that, systemi-
cally and according to its own logic, negotiates culturally divergent perceptions of  
social reality.
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Public engagement within the sphere of  development cooperation can take vari-
ous forms. Kyrgyzstan as an example clearly illustrates the limits of  today’s public 
engagement of  development-aid organizations and other relevant actors. In Kyr-
gyzstan, public information on development aid is often provided unidirectional, 
with no possibility for reaction and no dialogue launched. Besides being scarce, 
information is usually only available in English. Hardly ever is information pro-
vided in Russian, let alone in the Kyrgyz language. Another specific problem is 
the fact that information is mostly provided on results and rarely on processes of  
project implementation. Last but not least, development aid projects lack public 
memory. Upon completion of  a project data referring to its existence seem to get 
lost and disappear, one prominent example being a project of  the National Dem-
ocratic Institute in Kyrgyzstan. A series of  TV-debates was organized throughout 
2006 and 2007, where one representative from the government discussed issues 
of  public political interest with a representative from the opposition. Although 
the debates have been recorded no subsequent archival storage was undertaken 
and most of  the content of  the debates and information on the project itself  was 
lost or is no longer available.
What can be done to improve this situation? And what are ways to initiate public 
communication for better representation of  cultural heterogeneity? What cer-
tainly needs to be done is the organization of  real platforms for exchange. Be 
they internet-based (e. g. project blogs), in form of  conferences and symposiums 
or workshops, what is important is the unconditional get-together of  partici-
pants and observers of  development aid to negotiate terms of  cooperation and 
thus cultural terms of  social perception. Carothers recommends to increase 
the efforts for participatory evaluation and participatory observation studies in 
regard to democracy promotion programs. In addition, the information gener-
ated with the help of  such studies should be made available for all actors in the 
sphere of  development cooperation, not only strategy experts in Western devel-
opment bank headquarters. Finally, public memories must be established where 
data regarding past projects is preserved. Information from former projects must 
be made available and be taken into account in ongoing strategy considerations 
for the purpose of  increased reflection. Otherwise, the reproduction of  project 
failure will continue.
To improve the effectiveness of  development aid and democracy promotion, 
initiatives should capitalize on the unparalleled opportunity of  communication 
provided by the public with all possible means and available creative potential. 
However, the public is often understood as an outcome of  democracy promotion. 
How, then, is it possible to utilize the public as a corrective mechanism, when 
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open societies are perceived to be absent in most of  the states, where democracy 
promoting activities take place? To answer this question the systemic character 
of  the public needs to be taken into account. In systems theory notions of  the 
public refer to a global social system which structures communication according 
to a code that differentiates into actual / non-actual. This understanding is rather 
unpolitical and does not refer to the public as a politically contested communi-
cative space. Such space is usually referred to as public opinion, the structural 
link between the two systems, the public and the political one. Most democracy 
promoting projects try to open up public space for different political opinions. In 
distinction from that, the idea of  a social system presented here aims at a more 
fundamental understanding of  the public where attention is directed according 
to actual needs (issues of  public concern), which are not necessarily political 
issues. As such, the public might serve as a (not necessarily politicized) platform 
for the exchange and negotiation of  heterogeneous modes of  cultural perception. 
The results of  such negotiation might serve as a precondition for the success-
ful implementation of  democracy promoting projects that aim at securing equal 
representation of  different political opinions in less democratic countries.
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What Went Wrong with Democracy Promotion in 
Kyrgyzstan?
Janyl Bokonbaeva
While greatly assisting the popular opposition movement before, during and im-
mediately after the March 2005 regime change in Kyrgyzstan, U. S. democracy aid 
has since been not as pro-active, lucid and continuous as it could have been. The 
ousting of  president Askar Akayev has likewise signaled an end to any significant 
U. S. democratization efforts—and although governance funding is still large as 
compared to other areas, it does no longer constitute a decent match for the cur-
rent and future challenges in the Kyrgyz political process.
A serious limitation of  the U. S.-American democratization policy has been too 
much focus on civil society development at the expense of  institutional capacity 
building—i. e. disproportions in areas of  priority. An immense flow of  attention 
and funding into NGOs has alienated many ordinary citizens and government 
officials who felt underprivileged, jealous and, therefore, suspicious about the 
entire enterprise. NGOs’ reaction to this kind of  sentiments was understandably 
negative, fuelling a cycle of  mutual mistrust and accusations. Even with excel-
lent programs of  civil society support implemented between 1995 and 2000, 
examples of  wrong planning and negligence for local factors abounded. Only a 
few viable advocacy NGOs have survived problems of  sustainability up to this 
day. These NGOs are not strong political actors and will most probably fall under 
strict patronage of  the state and individual politicians.
A. Musabaeva raises another important issue by underlining implications of  a 
sudden shift in donor preferences from political mobilization groups to com-
munity-based organizations (CBOs) providing social services in the mid 1990s. 
According to this expert, the democratizing potential of  such localized CBOs is 
very small. Interaction is mostly an intra-, not inter-group one, and issues at stake 
rarely involve actors from other levels. These interactions are therefore contained 
and limited to themselves—contributing, in a certain degree, to even more frag-
mentation within the Kyrgyz society. This argument is not indisputable, but gains 
credibility if  one examines Kyrgyz NGOs’ inability to participate meaningfully in 
the constitution drafting process in 2007.
Nonetheless, there is little possibility for a sustainable civil society to emerge in 
the absence of  institutionalized democratic traditions, a strong and viable state 
and a robust corporate sector—or put differently, in a climate of  endemic cor-
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ruption and profound economic difficulties in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, NGOs must 
not be viewed as operating in a separate universe, free of  any outside influences. 
This misperception is exactly what Thomas Carothers warns about and what 
many democracy promoters have unwillingly fallen into. Focusing exclusively on 
civil society organizations and paying only minor attention to the state apparatus 
is a strategy doomed to fail.
The bottom-up approach has long been a trademark of  American democratiza-
tion efforts, which has indeed worked in many cases, including Kyrgyzstan—to 
a certain extent. Nevertheless, common sense demands that the two approach-
es—bottom-up and top-down— be complementary to each other and carried out 
simultaneously. In the Kyrgyz case, however, disproportions have been glaring.
As regards the top-down approach, American efforts have been largely inefficient. 
Changing institutional behavior and bringing about structural change is a daunt-
ing task, but promises more success in terms of  sustainability and irreversibility 
of  democratic transformation. So far, not many democracy promoters (less so 
Washington authorities) have been cognizant of  the untidy and gloomy under-
world of  Kyrgyz politics, where most of  the actual decision-making and alliance 
forging is done. Blithe reliance on formal rules and over-confidential treatment 
of  official commitments have led many to disappointment over the reality of  
political processes.
Of  course, no aid regardless of  its scale can bring about fundamental change 
to legal and executive systems in transition countries—but sober realization of  
this is exactly what caused disappointment and even reluctance on the part of  
the public. Seeing the ways in which many good-willed initiatives “glided on the 
surface” of  troubled waters (or even contributed, as some think, to malevolent 
practices) made many doubt any real effect of  the American assistance. As told 
by a 38-year-old Kyrgyz housewife, “Americans give computers to judges, but 
these judges still keep on extorting money from ordinary people like us for ruling 
favorably on our cases.”
Public policy initiatives conducted under the auspices of  various democratization 
projects often missed the mark. Politicians would eagerly pay lip service to the 
necessity of  “open and transparent” negotiations—such rhetoric indeed would 
go down very well among the donors. Meanwhile, the skeptical public would 
watch sweeping promises fly by even as behind-the-scenes deals were struck. It is 
therefore evident, that even when the top-down approach to democratization was 
undertaken, its scope was insufficient and its reach limited. If  attempts were ever 
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carried out to engage Kyrgyz leaders into behaving democratically on a sustain-
able and principled basis, then these attempts have not borne fruit yet.
This account seems critical; however, one thing is to be underlined. If  democracy 
did not take root in Kyrgyzstan, it is because of  the weakness of  the state, not 
failures of  democratization measures. Overall, Kyrgyzstan has not had the capac-
ity to cope with overwhelming democracy challenges, because the country lacked 
basic democracy preconditions from the start. What opportunities were there 
came to be dispersed and overborne by economic hardships, pervasive corrup-
tion and political instability. Although political dynamics are in some cases show-
ing positive signs, persisting insecurity leads to mass migration, criminalization, 
growth of  shadow economy and political apathy—all of  it undermining what 
little has been left of  the pledge for democracy.
In conclusion, it has to be emphasized that U. S.-American democracy promotion 
has been invaluable in making Kyrgyzstan a more open and pluralistic country. 
Still, democracy assistance shortcomings have been many, and not limited to 
technical or implementation aspects. Uneven funding, under-aiding state institu-
tions, but mostly inconsistencies in following the democratization tracks have all 
discredited the policy. The appeal was lost, and so grew resentment and disbelief  
among the broader recipient society. The majority of  ordinary Kyrgyz associate 
democracy with anarchy, rule of  the rich, corruption and political instability. In 
Janyl Bokonbaeva from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek
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such circumstances, democracy does not have the power of  an essential value and 
a worthy ideal, and is becoming a shallow concept indeed.
This is not an unfamiliar picture to those engaged in democracy promotion 
around the globe, and the same conditions are probably manifest in many other 
Asian, African and/or East European countries. Surprising is the slowness and 
resistance with which the upper decision-making layer in the U. S. administration 
reacts to all-too-evident calls for change—and fails to learn from mistakes.
Overall, U. S.-American interest in promoting democracy in Kyrgyzstan is already 
insignificant and will most likely decrease. With other external actors unable and/
or unwilling to pursue a vigorous democratization policy, we witness a failure of  
the democracy promise in Kyrgyzstan.
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